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FREE SPEECH AND CORPORATE
FREEDOM: A COMMENT ON
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF
BOSTONv.BELLOTTI
CARL E. SCHNEIDER*

The Constitution cannot be applied in disregard of the external circumstances in which men live and move and have their being. Therefore, neither the First nor the Fourteenth Amendment is to be treated
by judges as though it were a mathematical abstraction, an absolute
having no relation to the lives of men.
-Felix Frankfurter 1

I. THE OPINIONS
The corporation was born in chains but is everywhere free. That
freedom was recently affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti. 2 In Bellotti, the Court overturned a Massachusetts criminal statute forbidding banks and business
corporations to make expenditures intended to influence referenda concerning issues not "m~terially affecting" the corporation's "property,
business, or assets." 3 In doing so, the Court confirmed its discovery that
commercial speech is not unprotected by the first amendment and announced a novel doctrine that corporate speech is not unprotected by the
first amendment.
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1970, Harvard University; J.D. 1979, University of Michigan.

I am grateful to T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Vincent Blasi, Edward H. Cooper, John Garvey,
Michael Rosenzweig, Frederick F. Schauer, Joan W. Schneider, Joel Seligman, Christopher D.
Stone, Joseph Vining, and Christina B. Whitman for their illuminating comments on earlier versions
of this paper.
1. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 152 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
2. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). I will for the sake of convenience refer to this case as "Bellotti."
3. /d. at 767.
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Although several years have passed since Bellotti was decided, the
case has received less attention than it deserves. As the Court's leading
consideration of the speech rights of corporations, it is a landmark in first
amendment law. Bellotti's significance is enhanced by the unusually direct judicial comments about, and indeed reliance on, theories of the first
amendment. Because the case addresses for the first time an important
constitutional problem, it presents with unusual clarity intriguing questions about styles in judicial reasoning. Finally, Bellotti is an event in the
continning debate over the power of the corporation, as well as in the
continning struggle against the corruption of politics. I seek in this Article to give the case the attention it merits on its own terms, as a problem
in styles of constitutional reasoning, and as a chapter in the history of the
uneasy relationship between the corporation and the law.
A.

THE MAJORITY OPINIONS

Until April 1978, chapter 55, section 8 of the Massachusetts General Laws forbade banks and business corporations to make expenditures
"for the purpose of ... influencing or affecting the vote on any question
submitted to the voters, other than one materially affecting any of the
property, business or assets of the corporation."4 Section 8 also provided
that "[n]o question submitted to the voters solely concerning the taxation
of the income, property or transactions of individuals shall be deemed
materially to affect the property, business or assets of the corporation." 5
In 1976, two national banking associations and three business corporations which opposed a referendum to enact a constitutional amendment
levying a graduated individual income tax sought to have section 8 declared unconstitutiona1. 6 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
upheld the statute. 7 The Supreme Court of the United States, by a vote
of five to four, reversed. 8
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell9 said the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court had erred when it "framed the principal question
in this case as whether and to what extent corporations have First
4.

MASS. GEN. LAW ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West. Supp. 1977) (quoted in Bellotti, 435 U.S. nt

768.)
5. /d.
6. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 769; see also First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Attorney Gen., 371 Mass.
773, 776-77 n.6, 359 N.E.2d 1262, 1265-66 n.6 (1977) (text of unprinted order).
7. First Nat'/ Bank of Boston, 371 Mass. 773, 359 N.E.2d 1262 (1977).
8. By the time the United States Supreme Court heard the case, the election hnd been held
and the referendum had been rejected. The case wns nevertheless not moot, since it dealt with n
controversy capable of repetition, yet evading review. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 774-75.
9. He wns joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens.
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Amendment rights." 10 Since "[t]he Constitution often protects interests
broader than those of the party seeking their vindication," and since
"[t]he First Amendment, in particular, serves significant societal interest," the "proper question" was whether the statute "abridges expression
that the First Amendment was meant to protect." 11 Justice Powell observed that "[t]he inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity
for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its
source" 12 and that, since the regulated speech was clearly political, it was
just as clearly protected by the first amendment. 13 The Court had only to
inquire, therefore, "whether the corporate identity of the speaker deprives this proposed speech of what otherwise would be its clear entitlement to protection." 14
The Court rejected the Massachusetts court's conclusion that a corporation's first amendment rights derive only from its fourteenth amendment property rights. "Freedom of speech and the other freedoms
encompassed by the First Amendment always have been viewed as fundamental components of the liberty safeguarded by the Due Process
Clause, . . . and the Court has not identified a separate source for the
right when it has been asserted by corporations." 15 Thus the first amendment, via the fourteenth, can protect interests beyond those "materially
affecting" the business of the corporation. Justice Powell then cited the
Court's commercial speech cases to show that "the First Amendment
goes beyond protection . . . of the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which
members of the public may draw." 16 Because the "information" spoke to
an electoral issue, it was at the core of the first amendment's scope and
was thus protected.
The Court next applied the compelling state interest test, noting that
the burden was on the government to show that the test had been met
and that the means used were narrowly drawn. 17 The Court found insufficient evidence in the record that the law was necessary to preserve "the
State's interest in sustaining the active role of the individual citizen in the
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 775-76.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.

at 776.
at 777.
at
at
at
at

778.
780.
783.
786.
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electoral process and thereby preventing diminution of the citizen's confidence in government." 18 The Court cited the under- and over-inclusiveness of the statute to show that it did not serve "the interest in protecting
the rights of shareholders whose views differ from those expressed by
management on behalf of the corporation." 19 The Court concluded that
"[b]ecause ... [section] 8 ... prohibits protected speech in a manner
unjustified by a compelling state interest, it must be invalidated."20
Chief Justice Burger joined the Court's opinion, but wrote a concurrence to express his fear that, were the position of the state court accepted, freedom of the press would be endangered. "This is so because of
the difficulty, and perhaps impossibility, of distinguishing, either as a
matter of fact or constitutional law, media corporations from corporations such as the appellants in this case.'m
B.

THE DISSENTS

Justice White wrote an emphatic dissent in which he was joined by
Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall. He began by pointing out that the
CoUrt had not disapproved the Massachusetts court's conclusion that the
income tax referendum had no material effect on the "business, property
or assets" of the corporations.22 He therefore stated the issue as
"whether a State may prevent corporate management from using the corporate treasury to propagate views having no connection with the corporate business.''23 The speech of business corporations, he wrote, does not
serve "what some have considered to be the principal function of the
First Amendment, the use of communication as a means of self-expression, self-realization and self-fu1fillment.''24 And while corporate speech
may serve the other first amendment function of protecting "the interchange of ideas,"25 such speech lacks "the connection with individual
self-expression which is one of the principal justifications for the constitutional protection of speech.''26 In any event, restriction of such speech
"impinges much less severely upon the availability of ideas to the general
public than do restrictions upon individual speech.''27 Furthermore, in
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.

at 787.
at 795.
at 796 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
at 802-03 (White, J., dissenting).
at 803.
at 804.
at 806.
at 807.
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enacting section 8, Massachusetts had not simply abridged the first
amendment interests of corporations. Rather, it had balanced competing
first amendment interests, some of which had to be abridged if the others
were to be effectuated. This accommodation of conflicting first amendment interests was of two kinds. First, since the state had endowed the
corporation with advantages which allowed the corporation to accumulate great sums of money, the state might be thought to be allowing the
corporation unfair advantages over other participants if it permitted the
corporation to compete freely in the political process.2 8 Second, the state
had a first amendment interest in "assuring that shareholders are not
compelled to support and financially further beliefs with which they disagree."29 In short, Justice White's dissent disagreed fundamentally with
the Court's formulation of the first amendment interests and its weighing
of the state interests in the case.
Dissenting separately, Justice Rehnquist reiterated his view "of the
limited application of the First Amendment to the States"30 and argued
that the fourteenth amendment protects the "property" but not the "liberty'' of business corporations.31 He cited Dartmouth College v. Woodward: "Being the mere creature of law, [a corporation] possesses only
those properties which the charter of creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.'m He could not readily
conclude "that the right of political expression is ... necessary to carry
out the functions of a corporation organized for commercial purposes,"
especially where that political activity was directed at matters having no
material effect on the corporation. 33 For these reasons, and because "the
States might reasonably fear that the corporation would use its economic
power to obtain further benefits beyond those already bestowed,"34 Justice Rehnquist thought the statute constitutional.
II. THE NEW FORMALISM: BELLOTTI AS A PROBLEM IN
JUDICIAL STYLES
As even this brief summary of the Court's opinion in Bellotti should
suggest, its judicial style is curiously formalistic. Formalism-"the notion that social controversies could be resolved by deductions drawn
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at

809.
812.
823 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
822.
823 (quoting 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819)).
825.
826.
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from first principles on which all men agreed or by inductions drawn
from the 'evidence' of past decisions" 35-is widely thought to have flourished from sometime after the Civil War until it was denounced andrenounced by the Supreme Court in 1937. Courts under its influence are
said to have conceived of the law in terms of "disembodied logical interrelationships"36 and to have ignored or mishandled facts inconvenient to
legal analysis and social preconceptions. The critics offormalism employ
cases like Lochner v. New York 31 to symbolize the misuse and disregard
offacts which conflict with legal categories and logic. Finally, and Lochner is again the exemplar, formalism often masked the use of law to serve
the economically powerful in general and the corporation in particular; a
service often consistent with the judges' "intuitions of public policy,
avowed or unconscious. " 38
The Court's opinion in Bellotti fits, if not neatly, at least recognizably, into this tradition. In Bellotti, the Court considered and rejected a
legislative attempt to govern the political and social power of the business corporation. The opinion has a quality of abstraction, of disembodiment, of remoteness from social reality, that makes it formalistic. It
reasons from highly abstract first amendment principles. It supports its
reasoning with argnments provable only through empirical investigation,
but substitutes logic for evidence. It treats the corporation in ways perhaps consistent with the logic of corporate law, but surely inconsistent
with the reality of corporate life.
Yet it will hardly do to pretend that the Bellotti Court is the Lochner Court. Speaking generally, never has the Court been as solicitous of
individual liberty as in the last thirty years. Never has the Court so readily countenanced, sustained, and even amplified legislative regulation of
economic and corporate life. Speaking more particularly and practically
of Bellotti, any facile political interpretation must cope with the simultaneous presence in dissent of the Court's two most liberal members-Justice Bremtan and Justice Marshall-and its most conservative memberJustice Rehnquist. 39
35. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in
Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REv. 513, 566 (1974).
36. M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977).
37. 198 u.s. 45 (1905).
38. 0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (1881); see also L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 455-56 (1973); M. HORWITZ, supra note 36, at 253·66; K. LLEWELLYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRADmON 40 (1960).
39. Of course, political extremes sometimes meet. But even if the two wings of the present
Court are extremes, one must still cope with the fact that the fourth dissenter-Justice White-is
one of the steadiest members of the Court's center.
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If all this is true-if today's Court would repudiate any charge of
formalism-why does the opinion in Bellotti seem so formalistic? I will
argue that it exemplifies what might be called the new formalism. The
new formalism has two sources. First, it arises from a renewed tendency
to rationalize law through the use of theory. This tendency itself has
numerous sources,40 and it has been particularly pronounced in first
amendment law. 4I I am far from suggesting that theory is useless or even
unneeded in interpreting law in general or the Constitution in particular.42 I do suggest that theory conduces to both over-simplification and
over-ambition-it is easy to convince oneself that the first amendment (to
take the relevant example) has a single purpose,43 that that purpose is
broad enough to address a grand range of the problems the twentieth
century has presented democracy, and that particular rules of decision
can be inferred simply by reasoning from that purpose.44 The danger of
theory can be stated in another way: It conduces to a deductive approach to social problems which American law does little to equip courts
to perform, which creates many possibilities for judicial activity but gives
courts scant guidance in choosing from them. 45
The second, and probably related, source of the new formalism
comes from the Court's response to an increasingly severe problem.
Constitutional litigation, although phrased in terms of principle, raises
social issues of stunning and forbidding complexity. No appellate court
has the time, the skill, or the wish to master the empirical realities that
underlie most questions of constitutional rights. And even if appellate
courts were willing, lawyers often would be unable to supply them with
satisfactory empirical studies of the issues to be resolved, since social science has left many such issues unexplored and has left many others unexplained. Further, as society becomes more complex, this problem
40. See, e.g., Schneider, The Next Step: Definition, Generalization, and Theory in American
Family Law, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1039, 1041-48 (1985). For a stimulating discussion of the actual
social effects of first amendment jurisprudence, see Nagel, How Useful is Judicial Review in Free
Speech Cases?, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 302 (1984).
41. See Bollinger, Free Speech and Intellectual Values, 92 YALE L.J. 438 (1983).
42. Quite the contrary, I have argued elsewhere that American family law has been impoverished by its resistance to theory. Schneider, supra note 40.
43. For a statement of and an attack on that conviction, see Shiffrin, The First Amendment and
Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U.L. REv.
1212 (1983).
44. See J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE PoLmCAL THOUGHT
AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADmON (1975).
45. For a somewhat similar statement of this aspect of the new formalism, see Nagel, Book
Review, 127 U. PENN. L. REV. 1174 (1979) (reviewing L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL
LAW).
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becomes more severe. The consequence is that courts increasingly rely
on logical inferences about how things must work instead of on investigations of how they do work. Thus a considerable part of constitutional
jurisprudence, particularly state-interest analysis in fourteenth amendment law, has come to consist of devices for simplifying questions about
social effects of legislation.46
In this Article, I argue that the Court's opinion in Bellotti suffers
from a formalism that arises from both these sources. I begin by suggesting that the Court's theory of the first amendment is stated at such a
level of abstraction that it cannot resolve particular questions and that
the Court's theory thus needs to be disciplined by consulting historical
experience and judicial doctrine. I amplify this point by discussing the
Court's theory in the historical and doctrinal context of the two first
amendment areas most central to the Court's opinion in Bellotti-the
commercial-speech doctrine and the right-to-receive doctrine. Next, I
suggest that the Court's use of theory is impaired by the Court's
problems in understanding social reality. I amplify this point by suggesting that our historical experience with the corporation justifies special restrictions on it and that the nature of corporate governance justifies
special doubts about the first amendment significance of corporate
speech. I argue that a further defect of the Court's theory is that it ignores the first amendment values served by limiting corporate political
speech. I amplify this point by proposing that a necessary, though not
sufficient, condition for resolving such a conflict between first amendment values is empirical evidence about how well those values are served
by alternative rules. Finally, I argue that because it analyzes Bellotti only
in terms of first amendment theory, the Court overlooks the other elements of constitutional jurisprudence which speak to the place of corporate power in a democracy.

III. THE COURT'S THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A.

THE COURT'S STATEMENT OF ITS THEORY OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT

In Bellotti, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had sought,
but not found, evidence that corporations have first amendment rights.
46. For a fascinating collection of studies of how complicated social-policy questions are simplified by courts, seeR. MNOOKIN, IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAW REFORM,
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1985). I comment on those simplifying devices in Schneider, Lawyers and
Children: Wisdom and Legitimacy in Family Policy, 84 MICH. L. REv. (1986) (forthcoming),
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The United States Supreme Court reached the opposite result by abandoning the direct search for corporate first amendment rights in favor of
an abstract and aggressively simple theory of free speech: more is more.
The more speech and information circulating, the better off society is and
the better the first amendment is served. Thus the Court treats speech,
not the speaker, as the beneficiary of the first amendment's protection:
"The question in this case, simply put, is whether the corporate identity
of the speaker deprives this proposed speech of what otherwise would be
its clear entitlement to protection."47
On its face, this approach to the first amendment is a little incongruous. By its terms, the amendment protects "freedom of speech," not
freedom to hear. The Court, of course, reasoned that the latter freedom
is necessarily implied by the former. But in the Bellotti situation that
reasoning seems circular: whether the corporation has a right to speak
depends on the listener's right to receive; but a listener presumably has a
right to receive ouly what the speaker has a right to say. Moreover, the
incongruity of Bellotti's theory is intensified by its distance from the general public's understanding of law and rights: in everyday language,
rights protect people, not corporations; in everyday thought, the first
amendment is needed for the unpopular few, not the powerful many.
The inconguity also may be understood in a somewhat different
way. "The people," acting through their government, have prohibited
certain entities from speaking about certain questions. Does the first
amendment prevent the people from doing so? Ordinarily, the answer
would be simple, because all people have a right to speak, either as part
of their right to govern or as part of their right of self-expression. But
here the would-be speaker is not a person and cannot benefit from the
right to speak because it has no right to govern and needs no right of selfexpression. The Court's argument is that a right resides in the people to
have the information they need to govern.48 Yet in the statute at issue
"the people" expressly decided not ouly that this information is not
needed to govern, but that allowing the corporation to speak corrupts the
electoral process and thus interferes with the people's effective exercise of
their right to govern.
How, then, does the Court seek to eliminate the apparent incongruities in Bellotti's reasoning? As so often, Alexander Meiklejohn is the
47. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778.
48. /d. at 791-92.
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deus ex machina.49 Meiklejohn deduced the meaning of the first amendment from the fact that the Constitution established a democracy. If the
people are sovereign, if they are the governors, they must have all the
information they need to govern. The government may not deprive the
governors of such information. Thus the Court in Bellotti cited
Meiklejohn for the proposition that "the people in our democracy are
entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative
merits of conflicting arguments." 50 As Meiklejohn himself said in a familiar passage:
Just so far as, at any point, the citizens who are to decide an issue are
denied acquaintance with information or opinion or doubt or disbelief
or criticism which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result must be
ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general good. It is that
mutilation of the thinking process the community against which the
First Amendment to the Constitution is directed. The principle of the
freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the program of selfgovernment. 51

There is much to be said for this argument. Indeed, much has been
said for it. But let us restate it in simpler terms as it applies to Bellotti.
The corporation may have no right to speak. Should it have one? To
find out, we consult the first amendment's purpose. That purpose is to
promote democratic government by making sure the citizenry is wellinformed. Giving the corporation the right to speak increases the quantum of information in circulation and thereby makes it easier for citizens
to have more information. Giving the corporation a right to speak thus
serves the purpose of the first amendment and is therefore required by
the amendment. Quod erat demonstrandum. The difficulty with this argument, though, is that it articulates a purpose for the first amendment
so broad that it comprehends many things which we doubt the first
amendment includes. 52 To put the point slightly differently, the first
amendment may serve the larger goal of promoting democratic government, but not everything that promotes democratic government is within
the scope of the first amendment.
49. See, e.g., Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1965); Kalven, The'New York Times Case: A Note on "The
Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SUP. Cr. REv. 191, 209-11.
50. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 791 (footnote omitted).
51. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLmCAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 27 (1960) (emphasis in original).
52. See Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and Redish's The
Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 646, 662-63 (1982); Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and
Categories of Expression, 40 U. PITT. L. REv. 519, 527 (1979).
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At this point, then, the Court's first amendment theory is too general and too simple to be effective in resolving particular issues. To use
its theory, the Court must be able to identify those things that both promote democratic government and are within the scope of the first amendment. Trying to do so through reasoning alone would set intolerable
demands on any court's (or any person's) time, intellect, imagination,
and anticipation. This, of course, is one of the problems traditionally
associated with formalism-that its generally high level of abstraction
makes its doctrines specially manipulable. One antidote to this fault of
formalism is to temper theory with an appreciation of the particular, to
interpret theory with an understanding of the historical and social circumstances of the specific issue at hand. Another, related, antidote is to
develop theory incrementally and inductively by consulting the teaching
of earlier cases. These antidotes, of course, cannot make theory precise
and dispositive, but they can provide a basis for criticizing and disciplining theory. One of the purposes of this Article is to apply these antidotes
to see what can be learned about the Bellotti Court's technique and
result.
We begin by looking at two bodies of precedent the Court does consult- the commercial speech cases and the right-to-receive cases. The
Court concludes from those cases that a right to receive information
would promote democratic government and is within the scope of the
amendment and that nothing about commercial speech makes it irrelevant to democratic government or takes it outside the scope of the first
amendment. I make two kinds of continuing arguments. First, I argue
that neither line of cases is as well-considered or as conclusive as the
Court implies. I make this argument not out of any simple-hearted belief
in the determinism of legal doctrine, but because the fragility and tentativeness of both lines of cases suggest we should be cautious in extending
them. Second, I argue that both lines are themselves problematic and
that the Court's reliance on them in formulating its first amendment theory is for this reason unwise.

B.

LINES OF PRECEDENT: THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH CASES

The Bellotti Court's most direct source for its "more is more" principle is its line of commercial speech cases, where the Court had shortly
before faced similar issues regarding the right of free speech in advertising. Those cases are cited in Bellotti to show that the first amendment
"prohibit[s] government from limiting the stock of information from

1238
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which members of the public may draw." 53 Advertisements are constitutionally protected not so much because they materially affect the seller's
business, but because they further the social "interest in the 'free flow of
commercial information.' " 54 Bellotti makes an implicit a fortiori argument from the commercial speech cases: if advertisements, which contribute only to the flow of commercial information, are protected, so
must be expenditures to affect referenda, since they enhance the flow of
political information, which is closer to the first amendment's core than
commercial information.
The commercial speech cases cited in Bellotti are in fact more limited than their centrality in the opinion implies. First, the commercial
speech cases, unlike Bellotti, generally assure access to information for
which there is a genuine demand from a relatively identifiable group of
people and which wonld be unavailable were a company forbidden to
advertise. Indeed, one set of these cases, far from securing the right of
commercial enterprises to speak, had the effect of pressuring them to
speak when they were (collectively, at any rate) reluctant to do so. This
set of cases might be said to rely more heavily on consumer-protection
and antitrust principles than first amendment principles, since those
cases involved professions which had evidently solicited the laws that
prohibited their members from advertising.
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 55 for example, rejected a law forbidding pharmacists to advertise prices. The plaintiffs were users of prescription drugs who complained of astonishingly disparate prices and, presumably, artificially
high profits. Similarly, Bates v. State Bar ofArizona 5 6 invalidated a state
bar's disciplinary rule prohibiting lawyers from advertising at all. The
offending advertisement in Bates was for a legal "clinic" whose proprietors explicitly intended to offer inexpensive legal services to people ordinarily unable to afford them. 57 Bates was preceded by years of criticism
of the bar's rules against advertising, criticism which included charges
that the rules helped sustain monopoly prices. 58
53. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783.
54. /d. (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
u.s. 748, 764 (1976)).
55. 425 u.s. 748 (1976).
56. 433 u.s. 350 (1977).
57. Id. at 354.
58. Cf. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (bar association's enforcement of a
minimum fee schedule for home title examinations by attorneys constituted price fixing).

1986]

CORPORATE FREEDOM

1239

Bigelow v. Virginia 59 can be seen in a somewhat similar light. That
decision invalidated a statute that made it a misdemeanor to circulate
any publication which encouraged or prompted the procuring of an abortion.60 The challenged advertisement had been published when New
York was almost the only place in the country where one could readily
obtain a legal abortion and when many women were going there for that
purpose. As the presence of the challenged advertisement suggests,
though, practical information about receiving an abortion in New York
could be hard for someone from out-of-state to obtain. There was thus a
genuine demand for the information, and it would otherwise have been, if
not unavailable, at least elusive. Given the notorious danger of illegal
abortions, calling Bigelow's result a work of consumer protection seems
apt. In addition, the decision itself relied, as the Court later conceded, on
the view that the statute infringed the right to an abortion. 61 Finally, the
decision's rationale was further clouded by the possible impairment of
free press rights such a state law might pose if enforced against national
publications. 62
Linmark Associates v. Township of Willingboro 63 does not fit this

consumer-protection model, but neither is it convincing authority for the
proposition that, because speech provides "information," that speech is
constitutionally protected, or for the proposition that commercial speech
simpliciter is constitutionally significant. In Linmark, the Court disapproved a local ordinance which, in an effort to prevent "white flight,"
prohibited placing "For Sale" and "Sold" signs in front of homes. The
suit thus involved the freedom of individuals to express their confidence
in or distress with their community and to state their reactions to an
important political issue-racial integration. As the fact of the ordinance
implies, there was apparently considerable interest in the community in
knowing how citizens were responding to that question, and citizens
communicated those responses-in the strongest terms-through these
signs.
This brief survey of the pre-Bellotti commercial speech cases thus
reveals a leading characteristic of those cases-in each there could usefully be said to be an actual, reasonably specific, "audience" for the
speech at issue. Those cases, then, may suggest that speech, not the
speaker, is protected, but they also suggest that where the speaker is not
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

421

u.s.

809 (1975).

Id. at 829.
See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 760 (1976).
Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 828-29.
431

u.s.

85 (1977).
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protected, there must be a plausibly identifiable audience which can plausibly be said to be interested in the speech. Let me put the point another
way. The Bellotti Court's theory is that speech is protected because of its
social value even where the "speaker" is not a human being with human
rights. That theory has some force in the context of the early commercial speech cases, because in them an audience could be identified whose
need for the speech was demonstrable and not readily satisfied through
other channels. Only in a painfully weak sense can this be said of the
speech at issue in Bellotti. As I will argue at greater length below, that
distinction, though not dispositive, is significant.
The first limitation of the commercial speech cases, then, relates to
the audience to whom the speech is addressed. The second limitation
relates to the speech itself. Although the Court in Virginia Pharmacy
lauded commercial speech as "indispensible to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how [a free enterprise] system ought to be regulated
or altered,"64 the Court also conceded that "[t]here are commonsense
differences between speech that does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction,' ... and other varieties. " 65 The main commonsense difference, apparently, is that commercial speech 'is more objective and
hardier than other varieties and therefore can withstand more regulation;
the speech that these cases freed dealt only in "facts." Thus the commercial speech cases do not "prohibit government from limiting the stock of
information from which members of the public may draw." 66 Rather,
they prohibit limiting the stock of fact, of "concededly truthful information."67 But one opposite of concededly truthful information is the kind
of political opinion the Court protected in Bellotti. As Justice Stewart's
concurring opinion in Virginia Pharmacy noted, "[T]he Court's determination that commercial advertising of the kind at issue here is not
'wholly outside the protection of' the First Amendment indicates by its
very phrasing that there are important differences between commercial
price and product advertising, on the one hand, and ideological communication on the other." 68 Yet despite the centrality of the commercial
speech cases to Bellotti, and despite Bellotti's reliance on the "informational purpose of the First Amendment," the opinion in Bellotti does not
discuss this basic difference between the two kinds of speech. Ordinarily,
64. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 748, 765.
65. Id. at 771 n.24 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376,
385 (1973)).
66. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783 (emphasis added).
67. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773.
68. Id. at 779.
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of course, political speech is protected however unreliable we may think
it is. But I will argue that the peculiar unreliability of corporate speech
combines with other factors to take it outside the protection of the first
amendment.
Not only was the line of commercial speech cases quite limited,
those cases themselves are unwise in ways that speak to the wisdom of
the Bellotti Court's free-speech theory. Although this is not the place for
a full-scale treatment of those cases, we will explore several relevant
problems with them. The first such problem is the Court's attack on
"paternalism." In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court scrutinized the state's
justifications for banning pharmaceutical advertisements and concluded
that the prohibition might indeed serve some of the state's purposes. But
that success would be ''based in large part on public iguorance." 69 That
basis was unacceptable:
There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic approach.
That alternative is to assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are
well enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open
the channels of communication rather than to close them. . . . It is
precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the
First Amendment makes for us. 70

The Court may well have been correct that overturning Virginia's
statute would raise the quality and lower the cost of pharmaceutical services. But the portion of the opinion which this quotation climaxes displays a formalism-a lack of interest in any genuine investigation of how
rules really work-so pronounced as to make us skeptical of the Court's
correctness. For example, as Professor Coase points out, "[n]o attention
was given to the possibility that greater price competition might reduce
the willinguess, indeed ability, of the pharmacists to supply services such
as advice on the proper use of drugs or the interaction of drugs taken on
prescriptions from different doctors." 71 For another example, the
Court's conclusion rests on the assumption that "high professional standards, to a substantial extent, are guaranteed by the close regulation to
which pharmacists in Virginia are subject.'m No empirical evidence (no
evidence at all) is cited for this sanguine proposition. Nor is any empirical evidence cited to demonstrate that people will perceive their own best
69.
70.
71.
72.

/d. at 769.
/d. at 770.
Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 31 (1977).
Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 768.
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interests if well informed. There surely are some issues about which
one's best interests are, for the non-expert, impossibly obscure. Virginia
Pharmacy might well present just such an issue--a choice between, on
one hand, a cheap pharmacist and, on the other, one who keeps full
records and an attentive watch on his customers and his field. I, at least,
have no idea which pharmacist the economically and medically rational
man would choose. I probably cannot be well enough informed-even
the experts may disagree, and even if they agree, it would surely take
some public education, not self-interested advertisements, to communicate their views. Finally, even if I can educate myself about one of these
issues, I will be a diligent consumer indeed if I can summon the time and
energy-to say nothing of the desire--to learn about all of them. In the
meantime, I might make serious mistakes.
In short, paternalism is not all bad. Furthermore, it is not easy to
know just what "paternalism" means in a democratic society. While
most first amendment law assumes that "the people" and "government"
are in natural opposition, at some level the government is the agent of the
people. And what the previous paragraph suggests is that the people
may sometimes choose to have the government do some of their work for
them by regulating businesses and professions. Has the first amendment
really "made the choice for us" that we cannot do so? Indeed, is it not
paternalistic even for the Court to advance the best interest of society to
justify striking dowu such democratically authorized regulations?
Furthermore, we (quite properly) expect government to make paternalistic choices for us continually. Consider, for example, the FDA's
regulation of food additives. Some prohibited additives are thought to be
harmful only in large quantities, and many of those additives have
properties-they are preservatives, they help keep down calories-that
an informed consumer might conclude made their use sensible for him,
even if not for other consumers. Yet we have the government make this
choice for all of us because, in our complex society, few of us have the
time, ability, or wish to decide for ourselves. This may be paternalism,
but by relieving us of numerous and often trivial choices, it is a paternalism that frees us to make choices that matter.
Consider another form of paternalism. Suppose, for instance, that
the government banned cigarette advertising in order to end the present
extravagant campaign to induce people to injure their own health. Here
people would be using government to help them resist their own weaknesses. Yet the goal of helping people stop smoking (or not start smoking) is so surely in each individual's own best interest, and in society's,
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that it would be a harsh and foolish Constitution which prohibited such a
law.
By now the alert reader will have observed that we are talking much
more about economic policy than about speech. Economic policy, as the
Court has repeatedly said, is essentially within the purview of the legislature, and the Court in Virginia Pharmacy expressly acknowledged that,
in interpreting the fourteenth amendment, it had regularly sustained justifications of the kind asserted by the Virginia Pharmacy Board. 73 The
Court in that case found that such justifications violated the first amendment, however, because "[i]t is a matter of public interest that [consumer
purchasing] . . . decisions . . . be intelligent and well informed"74 and
because "the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information ... may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest
in the day's most urgent political debate." 75 This may be so, but the
public interest in the nature of consumer purchasing decisions is an interest in the proper functioning of the economic system, and questions
about the functioning of that system belong to the legislature, not only
for constitutional reasons, but because the legislature and the administrative agencies it creates are better equipped than courts to deal with the
empirical and technical issues economic problems present.76 The fact
that an individual's interest is ''keen" does not by itself bring that interest
within the scope of the first amendment, for it is the nature, not the
strength, of the interest that is controlling. 77
The irony of the Court's position is that the consumer's increment of
first amendment freedom is bought at the price of a diminution in economic freedom. There is no doubt that the state may, for instance, ban
the sale of air conditioners as a means of compelling energy conservation.
Yet the state apparently may not limit advertising of air conditioners in
73. 425 U.S. at 769. The Board's economic justifications were maintaining the high degree of
professionalism among licensed pharmacists, promoting the health of consumers, and preventing
price wars among pharmacists. Id. at 766-68.
74. Id. at 765.
75. Id. at 763.
76. For a fuller exposition of this argument, see Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1 (1979). The technical nature of
many of the questions in the commercial speech cases is suggested by the frequency with which the
regulation at issue in them has been promulgated by an administrative agency.
77. The Court also believes that advertising is constitutionally protected because it provides
information necessary to formulate views on how the economic system should be regulated. See
Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765. This seems to me a makeweight argument. For that purpose,
what the citizen needs is systematic evidence about price structure and the quality of products,
evidence which even numerous and frequent advertisements would present only randomly and
unreliably.
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the service of the same goal without encountering first amendment difficulties. 78 This is anomalous, for in the name of personal freedom it inhibits the state from promoting its goals through the means least
restrictive of personal freedom.
In short, the second problem with the commercial speech cases we
have seen is that commercial speech is part of commerce and therefore
within the scope of legislative regulation. The third problem is that commercial speech is constitutionally inferior speech. This was, of course,
long the historical position of the Court, and even today commercial
speech has a "subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values."79 As Professors Jackson and Jeffries suggest, "[M]easured in terms
of traditional first amendment principles, commercial speech is remarkable for its insignificance. It neither contributes to self-government nor
nurtures the realization of the individual personality."80
In response to this argument it is often said that commercial speech
must nevertheless be protected because no satisfactory line can be drawn
between commercial and non-commercial speech. Professors Jackson
and Jeffries note, however, that such a line existed and worked tolerably
well until Virginia Pharmacy and that, because commercial speech is
even now less protected than most other speech, such a line is in fact still
needed. 81 Indeed, the new commercial speech doctrine necessitates
drawing many troubling new lines. For example, the Court does not
deny the need to regulate fraudulent and misleading advertising. Yet not
only is the line between regulable and non-regulable advertising uncertain, it is not clear why the Court's "market-theory'' of speech does not
apply to all kinds of advertising. Why isn't it just as paternalistic for the
state to distinguish between false and true ideas in economics as in politics? Worse, the distinction between regulable and non-regulable speech
will have to turn on the content of the speech, precisely the ground for
regulation the Court ordinarily finds most offensive.

The fourth and final difficulty with the commercial speech cases is
not just that they commit the Court to a daunting task of linedrawing;
they also commit it to a probably endless series of case-by-case resolutions of exactly the kind of issues which a court is least equipped to deal
78. Cf Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566·71
(1980) (New York Public Service Commission's ban of promotional advertising by a public utility
violates first and fourteenth amendment protection of free speech).
79. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
80. Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 76, at 14; see also BeVier, The First Amendment and Political
Speech: An Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits ofPrinciple, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 353-55 (1978).
81. Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 76, at 24.
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with-issues ratsmg complicated empirical questions and technical
problems regarding economic and social policy. In Friedman v. Rogers, 82
for instance, the Court struggled to decide, not the nature of a constitutional right, but the economic and social effects of a law which prohibited
optometrists from practicing under a trade name. Here, as in most of the
commercial speech cases and in Bellotti, the empirical evidence the Court
could intelligently assimilate was minimal, and the majority and minority
had to be content with equally plausible a priori arguments. Thus the
majority concluded: "Rather than stifling commercial speech, [section]
5.13(d) ensures that information regarding optometrical services will be
communicated more fully and accurately to consumers than it had been
in the past when optometrists were allowed to convey the information
through unstated and ambiguous associations with a trade name." 83 The
minority, just as persuasively, just as speculatively, wrote:
As a result of these and other rules, the Rogers organization is able to
offer and enforce a degree of uniformity in care at all its offices along
with other consumer benefits, namely, sales on credit, adjustment of
frames and lenses without costs, one-stop care, and transferability of
patient records among Texas State Optical offices.
. . . For those who need them, eyeglasses are one of the ''basic
necessities" of life in which a consumer's interest "may be as keen, if
not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political
debate." 84

In sum, our review of the commercial speech cases suggests that
they are both limited and unwise in ways that speak to the soundness of
the Bellotti Court's first amendment theory. Those cases seem directed
toward speech for which there is a demand for relatively factual information from a reasonably identifiable group of people. These limits raise
doubts about extending the commercial speech cases to the situation in
Bellotti, where there was no evidence of any demand for the proposed
speech, where the proposed speech was opinion rather than fact, and
where the proposed audience was the public at large. Further, the commercial speech cases rest on a view of paternalism which is unduly critical, which overemphasizes the distinction between the people and their
government, and which scants the principle that decisions about the ordering of economic life and social power are properly confided to the
82. 440 u.s. 1 (1979).
83. /d. at 16.
84. /d. at 21-22 (Blackrnun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted)
(quoting Virigina State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 76364 (1976)).
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legislature. Each of these criticisms can plausibly be applied to Bellotti.
But before I develop them further, we need to look at the other set of
cases the Court uses to give particularity and authority to its first amendment theory.
C.

LINES OF PRECEDENT: THE "RIGHT TO RECEIVE"

The Bellotti Court's second line of precedent is composed of those
cases which may imply that there is a "right to hear" independent of a
right to speak and which consequently are employed to justify protecting
speech independently of speakers. The Court is indeed willing to say that
there is such a right. Some commentators insist that the right is an important one. 85 The Court in Virginia Pharmacy said, "Freedom of
speech presupposes a willing speaker. But where a speaker-exists, ... the
protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both. This is clear from the decided cases." 86 Yet the right-tohear cases cited in Virginia Pharmacy are hardly so definite. The right to
hear has been used, where it has been used at all, primarily to garnish
more conventional first amendment arguments. In the two cases where
the right to hear has apparently created a right to speak, the scope, the
terms, and possibly even the fact, of that creation are vague. 87
Modem courts would probably explain the early right-to-hear cases
in other terms, and even the courts which considered them, treated the
right to hear as peripheral. Martin v. Struthers 88 was a leafletting case in
which a city contended that many of its residents worked at night, slept
85. See, e.g., Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1; Note,
The Right to Know in First Amendment Analysis, 57 TEX. L. REv. 505 (1979); Comment, The Right
to Receive and the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 63 GEO. L.J. 775 (1975); Comment, Freedom to
Hear: A Political Justification of the First Amendment, 46 WASH. L. REV. 311 (1971).
86. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756.
87. Here, as elsewhere, I direct my discussion only to the cases relied on in Bellotti. I thus
pretermit the relatively recent line of cases treating access of the press to criminal trials. In any
event, I believe a useful distinction might be drawn between, on one hand, cases (like the press-access
cases) that deal with the public's right to know what the government is doing and, on the other
hand, cases that deal with the public's interest in hearing what a private citizen (or entity) wants to
say. I would argue that the former category of cases is more central to the interests the first amendment protects, since information about what the government is doing is likely both to speak more
directly to what the government should be doing (and who should be elected or reelected to office)
and to be harder to obtain through alternative means than information about private citizens or
entities. Of course, the state interest in preventing the publication of information about the government also may be stronger than the state interest in regulating information from nongovernmental
sources. Cf. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (lower court decision that
government failed to show justification for impositions and prior restraints on articles affecting
United States security in Vietnam affirmed).
88. 319 u.s. 141 (1943).
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during the day, and therefore did not want to be disturbed by leafletters. 89 Part of the Court's riposte to that contention was that other citizens would want to receive the leaflet and had a right to decide for
themselves. 90 Nevertheless, it was the leafletters' right to speak which
was central to the holding. 91 Thomas v. Collins 92 was what now seems a
straightforward free speech and free assembly case of a union representative's right to make an organizing speech without being licensed by the
state. It is cited as precedent for the right to receive because the Court
said that the workers had a right to organize, and that right "included
their right fully and freely to discuss and be informed concerning this
choice, privately or in public assembly:" 93 Marsh v. Alabama 94 held that
a Jehovah's Witness had a first amendment right to distribute literature
in the business district of a town wholly owned by one company. The
Court may well have been influenced by concern for the residents' ability
to obtain information, but Marsh is probably best understood as responding to the special history and circumstances of the Southern company
town. In any event, Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner 95 and Hudgens v. NLRB 96
seem to limit sharply Marsh's relevance and to cast doubt on the present
status of the right to receive. 97
Two later right-to-hear cases also have failed to become convincing
precedents. The first, Griswold v. Connecticut, 98 overturned the conviction of officers of a Planned Parenthood clinic for informing married
couples about contraception. Justice Douglas' imaginative opinion cites
Martin v. Struthers for the right "to receive" and "to read"; builds a
broad view of the first amendment; adds the (inferred) right of association; recruits the third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments; and detects
89. Id. at 44.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 146-47.
92. 323 u.s. 516 (1945).
93. Id. at 534.
94. 326 u.s. 601 (1946).
95. 407 u.s. 551 (1972).
96. 424 u.s. 507 (1976).
97. In Hudgens, the warehouse employees of a shoe company which had a store in a large
shopping mall went on strike and picketed the store. The situation seemed to present an unusually
favorable case for the right to hear. The shopping center was large enough (60 stores, a parking lot
for 2640 cars) to be the functional equivalent of the business district in Marsh. Hudgens, 424 U.S. at
509. As potential customers of the picketed store, the audience in Hudgens presumably had a special
interest in the information the strikers wished to communicate, those potential customers were probably the only audience the speakers were interested in reaching, and the store was the most effective
place for the audience to learn about the strike. Nevertheless, Hudgens held that the strikers had no
constitutional right to picket, nor, inferentially, did the audience have a right to hear. Id. at 521.
98. 381 u.s. 479 (1965).
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emanations from these amendments that form penumbras which create
zones of privacy which protect the marital relationship from intrusions
into its intimate decisions. Under these circumstances, the right to hear
in Griswold sinks dangerously close to dictum. In any event, Douglas'
opinion, while often quoted, has not been widely relied on by the Court. 99
In the second case, Stanley v. Georgia, 100 the Court announced a right to
possess pornography in the privacy of one's home. Subsequent decisions,
however, have established that Stanley is a sport; 101 it certainly has fostered no right to produce or distribute pornography.
In a class by itself among the right-to-hear cases cited in Bellotti is
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. 102 While Red Lion contains language
about the public's right to hear, it is pervaded by those special problems
caused by what the Supreme Court is convinced are the limited number
of usable broadcasting channels and the consequent need to regulate
broadcasters. Its analysis also is affected by the applicability of the free
press clause, which I will suggest has a rather different scope from the
free speech clause. 103
Three other cases relied on in Bellotti provide somewhat more convincing-yet still cloudy-evidence for the right to receive. In Lamont v.
Postmaster General, 104 the Court invalidated a statute which permitted
the Post Office to hold any mail from abroad which the Secretary of the
Treasury had determined to be "communist political propaganda" until
the addressee specifically requested it. 105 Justice Brennan, with whom
Justice Goldberg joined, concurred to argue that the Court had relied on
the addressee's right to receive the mail, since the Court had discussed
neither the first amendment rights of the senders (who were foreign governments) nor the addressee's standing to raise the sender's rights. 106
Justice Brennan went on to analyze and justify the right to receive. 107
How much of this analysis the Court accepted is unclear. The majority's
most explicit statement was:
99. See Note, Fornication, Cohabitation, and the Constitution, 77 MtcH. L. REV. 252, 255-56
(1978).
100. 394 u.s. 557 (1969).
101. E.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65-68 (1973) (state may regulate the
exhibition of obscene materials shown in a constitutionally unprotected setting).
102. 395 u.s. 367 (1969).
103. See infra notes 189-92 and accompanying text.
I 04. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
105. Id. at 305.
106. /d. at 307-10 (Brennan, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 308-09.
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We rest on the narrow ground that the addressee in order to receive his
mail must request in writing that it be delivered. This amounts in our
judgment to an unconstitutional abridgment of the addressee's First
Amendment rights. The addressee carries an affirmative obligation
which we do not think the Government may impose on him. This
requirement is almost certain to have a deterrent effect, especially as
respects those who have sensitive positions. 108

This sounds something like a right to receive, but if the Court meant to
establish such a right, why did Justice Breunan feel that he had to write
separately, and why didn't the majority respond to Justice Breunan by
acknowledging that it had established that right? Furthermore, the
Court cited none of the standard right-to-receive cases except one of the
weakest-Thomas v. Collins 109-and cited it only to show the impropriety of a "registration requirement imposed on a labor union organizer
before making a speech." 110 All the other cases the Court cited were
likewise "licensing" cases-Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 111 Lovell v. Griffin, 112 and Harman v. Forssenius. 113 The citation of these cases and the
emphasis in Lamont on the significance of the mails and on the fact that
"[t]he Act sets administrative officials astride the flow of mail to inspect
it, appraise it, write the addressee about it, and await a response before
dispatching the mail" 114 might suggest that it is government interference
with a special, governmentally administered, near-monopoly form of
communication-the mails-which is offensive. The same evidence, and
the express language of the passage quoted above, also might indicate
that it is being required to draw attention to one's association with an
(unpopular) idea that is offensive.
The specialness of the mails also seemed to influence the second of
the stronger right-to-hear cases. In Procunier v. Martinez, 115 the Court
overturned rules restricting prisoners' personal correspondence but declined to do so in terms of "prisoners' rights," since "a narrower basis of
decision is at hand." 116 The Court then explained why "mail censorship
108. Id. at 307.
109. 323 U.S. 516 (1945). See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
110. Lamont, 381 U.S. at 306.
111. 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (license tax on Jehovah's Witness' distribution and sale of pamphlets
held unconstitutional).
112. 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (requirement of municipal license for distributors of literature held
unconstitutional).
113. 380 U.S. 528 (1965) (registration requirement for federal electors who did not pay state
poll tax held unconstitutional).
114. Lamont, 381 U.S. at 306.
115. 416 u.s. 396 (1974).
116. Id. at 408.
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implicates more than the right of prisoners": 117
Communication by letter is not accomplished by the act of writing
words on paper. Rather, it is effected only when the letter is read by
the addressee. Both parties to the correspondence have an interest in
securing that result . . . . Whatever the status of a prisoner's claim to
uncensored correspondence with an outsider, it is plain that the latter's
interest is grounded in the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of
speech. . . . [T]he addressee as well as the sender of direct personal
correspondence derives from the First and Fourteenth Amendments a
protection against unjustified governmental interference with the intended communication. 118

On one hand, this sounds much like a right to receive. The emphasis is
on letters, but is not all "communication" left unaccomplished by simply
writing or speaking? On the other hand, do the special circumstances of
letters give their recipients a special interest in receiving them? Is it important that "personal correspondence" is addressed to a particular person? That suggestion is reinforced by the sentences which follow the
above quotation:
We do not deal here with difficult questions of the so-called "right to
hear" and third-party standing but with a particular means of communication in which the interests of both parties are inextricably meshed.
The wife of a prison inmate who is not permitted to read all that her
husband wanted to say to her has suffered an abridgment of her interest in communicating with him as plain as that which results from
censorship of her letter to him. 119

In short, seen as precedent for a right to receive, Lamont and
Procunier are swathed in ambiguity. Both cases, however, involved the
mails, both cases involved particular individuals, and both cases involved
the continuing intervention of a government agency in the communicative affairs of those individuals. It is at least a distance from these two
cases to a right to receive vested in the public at large.
The third of the stronger right-to-receive case-Kleindienst v.
Mande/ 120-is strong in its dictum only, for its result runs directly
counter to a right to hear. In Mandel, the Attorney General, relying on a
statute permitting him to deny visas to aliens publishing the "doctrines of
117. Id.
118. Id. at 408-09 (citing Lamont, 381 U.S. at 301).
119. Id. at 409. One may also infer from the Court's opinion that it was anxious to avoid setting
a "prisoner's rights" precedent.
120. 408 u.s. 753 (1972).
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world communism or the establishment in the United States of a totalitarian dictatorship," 121 had excluded a Belgian Marxist scholar from the
country. Several American scholars sued to have that decision reversed.
The case, the Court wrote, came down "to the narrow issue whether the
First Amendment confers upon the ... professors, because they wish to
hear, speak, and debate with Mandel in person, the ability to determine
that Mandel should be permitted to enter the country." 122
The Court began by quoting Stanley v. Georgia to the effect that
" '[i]t is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to
receive information and ideas. This freedom [of speech and press] ...
necessarily protects the right to receive. . . .' Martin v. City of
Struthers. .. .'' 123 But as the Court pointed out, "appellees' First
Amendment argument would prove too much. In almost every instance
of an alien excludable under [the statute], there are probably those who
would wish to meet and speak with him.'' 124 The Court, therefore, after
invoking the extensive powers of Congress and the President in dealing
with foreigu affairs and the entry of aliens, upheld the Attorney General's decision. One cannot tell from the opinion how significant that
invocation was, but any attempt to interpret the case as dispositive evidence of the right to receive must be tempered by the outcome of the case
and the Court's identification of one of the weaknesses of the right-toreceive argument-namely, its uncertain, and possibly distant, limits. 125
If the question is whether there is a right to receive, the answer must
be that, after the commercial speech cases and Bellotti, there is at least
something like it. But the point of this discussion has been to investigate
the foundations of those cases to determine their solidity. Each right-toreceive case builds largely on dicta from earlier right-to-receive cases.
The Court has never examined carefully the origin or the implications of
such a right, and until recently it has in practice been quite cautious
about extending the right. 126
121. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(G)(V) (1982).
122. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 762.
123. /d. at 762-63 (quoting Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564).
124. /d. at 768.
125. An example of such a limit is the question whether municipalities have a constitutional
right to expend municipal funds to influence the outcome of referenda. For an exposition of that
question and a convincing demonstration that it should be answered negatively, see M. YuooF,
WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GoVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 4250 (1983).
126. Outside the right-to-receive cases cited in the text, the Court has been particularly cautious
about extending that right to the "right to know." See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1
(1978); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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In this section, then, we have seen that the Court relies on a highly
general and abstract view of the first amendment's purpose and gives that
view particularity and concreteness through the commercial speech and
right-to-hear cases. But, I have argued, those cases do little to amplify
and sharpen the Court's first amendment doctrine, and on the contrary,
raise doubts about it. Of course, consulting the teaching of precedent is
ouly one way to curb the excesses of the new formalism, and so the
doubts generated by these two lines of cases are hardly conclusive. Thus,
our next step must be to use these doubts to identify and illumine some of
the empirical specifics that the Court is led to overlook by the abstractness of its theory.
IV.

THE RELEVANCE OF THE CORPORATE FORM

I have said that, in Bellotti, the Court drew much of its theory from
Meiklejohn's analysis of the right to know. Meiklejohn himself, however, explicitly excluded from first amendment protection speech motivated by a desire for private profit. 127 He also followed out the
implications of his analogy to a town meeting: "[T]he meeting has assembled, not primarily to talk, but primarily by means of talking to get
business done. And the talking must be regulated and abridged as the
doing of the business under actual conditions may require." 128 The first
amendment thus "is not the guardian of unregulated talkativeness. It
does not require that, on every occasion, every citizen shall take part in
public debate. . . . What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but
that everything worth saying shall be said." 129 Meiklejohn's caution in
this respect highlights the suspicious simplicity of the Court's "more is
more" theory. 130 That simplicity should lead us to ask, in the context of
Bellotti, whether there is anything about the corporation and its historical, political, economic, or social situation that might justify treating its
speech differently from the speech of individuals.
The Court's opinion in Bellotti barely discussed what a corporation
is, whom it represents, who owns it, who runs it, or who speaks when it
speaks. Instead, the Court formalistically accepted the fictions of corporate law. But those questions, along with the question of how much
power the corporation has and should have, are surely crucial to the case,
for the nature of the corporation makes it au unsuitable candidate for
127.
128.
129.
130.

A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 51, at 79, 83.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 26.
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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free speech rights, even under the Court's first amendment theory. 131
The Court in Bellotti conceded that sometimes "a justification for a
restriction on speech that would be inadequate as applied to individuals
might suffice to sustain the same restriction as applied to corporations,
unions, or like entities." 132 And the Court noted that certain "purely
personal" guarantees "are unavailable to corporations and other organizations because the 'historic function' of the particular guarantee has
been limited to the protection ofindividuals." 133 Whether a guarantee is
unavailable to a corporation depends "on the nature, history, and purpose of the particular constitutional provision." 134 These seem to me
useful (if incomplete) criteria, ones that would discipline and enrich the
Court's theory of the first amendment. But as we will see, the Court does
not apply them.
This section argues that it is exactly because the speech comes from
a corporation that we are justified in regulating it. It suggests that historically the corporation has been considered to be subject to, and even to
require, heightened regulation; that the special relationship between government and the corporation differentiates corporate speech from an individual's speech; that corporate speech is of a different, and less
valuable, quality from that of individuals; and that corporate speech cannot be justified as that of an association of individuals.
A.

THE HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

The history of the American corporation is marked by a tension
between the need for an entity strong enough to accomplish its economic
functions and the need to be able to control it politically. In that history,
the courts have played a preeminent part, although they have perhaps
better served the former need than the latter.
At first, of course, there was almost no such thing as the corporation; it was, Professor Hurst reminds us, "a rare thing, an unusual grant
of special privileges in law for purposes of high policy." 135 The state
131. This discussion, like the statute in Bellotti, is primarily aimed at the large commercial
corporation.
132. 435 U.S. at 777-78 n.13.
133. /d. at 779 n.14.
134. /d.
135. J. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDmONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY
UNITED STATES IS (1956). For a valuable study of the relationship of the government and the
corporation, see also J. HURST, THE LEGmMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES: 1780-1970 (1970).
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tightly controlled the few early business corporations, sometimes by actual state partnership in the corporate enterprise. 136 But business found
it needed
provision for ordinary use of an organization through which entrepreneurs could better mobilize and release economic energy. Partly this
business demand was to get rid of a limiting governmental policy; it
sought release of the law's jealously restrictive control over this type of
association.... [But entrepreneurs also] wanted the positive prestige
of the sanction of the state implicit in the charter grant. They wanted
the aid of an orderly capital subscription procedure. . . . [T]he grant of
the limited liability privilege was sought as a positive aid by law to the
enlistment of capital. Entrepreneurs wanted, too, a form of organization which firmly and broadly delegated power over mobilized capital
to managers and directors. 137

It was thus recognized early that corporations, as state-promoted concentrations of power and wealth, posed dangers and that, in the words of
the Massachusetts Attorney General of 1802, "[t]he creation of a great
variety of corporate interests ... must have a direct tendency to weaken
the power of government." 138 A number of states, anticipating that corporate interests might corrupt state legislatures, constitutionally required
two-thirds majorities for bills creating or altering corporations. 139 When,
in its most prominent act in the early development of the corporationDartmouth College v. Woodward 140-the Supreme Court decided that,
since a corporate charter was a contract, its terms could not be changed
by the legislature during the charter's term, 141 legislatures responded by
requiring that corporate charters expressly preserve the state's right to
change or repeal them.

This pattern of conflict between legislature and court over the corporation (although "pattern" is too simple a word for so complex a relationship) became more pronounced toward the end of the nineteenth
century, when the "general trend was for law to allow corporations to do
whatever they wished, to exercise any power, and to build up the freedom of the corporate management. In counter attack, powers of specific
corporations or industries were increasingly and unevenly circumscribed,
136. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 169 (1973).
137. J. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM, supra note 135, at 17.
138. James Sullivan, Attorney General of Massachusetts, quoted in L. FRIEDMAN, supra note
38, at 173.
139. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 173.
140. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). The Court's other major corporation case, however, demanded strict construction of corporate charters. See Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36
U.S. (11 Pet.) 496 (1837).
141. Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 650.
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primarily by statute."I42 Private and public law cases expanded dramatically the power of the corporation. The ultra vires doctrine was circumvented. The business-judgment rule liberated corporate managers.
Finally, as Professor McCloskey notes, a central feature of the judicial
response to legislative limits on the corporation grew from the fact that
the [Supreme Court] had conceded, rather ofthandedly, that corporations were "persons" within the meaning of the [Fourteenth] Amendment, and that concession was now seen to be of epic importance and
of incalculable value to the business community. Combined with the
now accepted idea of due process as a substantive limit on "arbitrary"
laws, it meant that business, whether incorporated or not, was no
longer wholly at the mercy of the popular will. I 43

A central problem of modem law continues to be the search for
ways to control the corporation. I44 That search has encompassed, for
instance, direct attempts to limit the corporation's influence over elections, the creation of numerous and various regulatory agencies, elaborate regulation of securities markets, efforts to prevent foreign bribery,
essays at assigning responsibility to boards of directors for effective corporate governance, the deployment of existing and the creation of new
criminal law to control corporate acts, the expansion of consumer's remedies, the attempt of the antitrust laws to bring corporations under the
discipline of competition, and encouragement oflabor unions as a "countervailing force" to the corporation. Yet as the wealth and size of corporations has grown, so has the recognition that regulation of the
corporation must encounter great difficulties.
Those difficulties are of at least two essential kinds. First, since
large corporations are such basic parts of society, they cannot be punished without punishing society in general and the innocent constituents
of the corporation in particular. Even the market often cannot be allowed to punish losers in corporate competition, as the government's response to Lockheed's and Chrysler's troubles suggests. Second, the
power of the corporation has permitted it to regulate the regulators, as
Gabriel Kolko, among many, has argued:
[T]he crucial factor in the American experience was the nature of economic power which required political tools to rationalize the economic
process, and that resulted in a synthesis of politics and economics.
142. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 446-47.
143. R. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 132 (1960).
144. See, e.g., C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE
BEHAVIOR (1975).
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This integration is the dominant fact of American society in the twentieth century....
The object of ... [the combination of the technological, economic,
and political spheres] was not merely capital accumulation, ... but a
desire to defend and exercise power through new media more appropriate to the structural conditions of the new century: the destructive
potential of growing competition and the dangerous possibilities of a
formal political democracy that might lead to a radical alteration of
the distribution of wealth. . . . Behind the economy, resting on new
foundations in which effective collusion and price stability is now the
rule, stands the organized power of the national government. 145

In short, the Court in Bellotti was wrestling with the problem of an
institution-the corporation-which to all intents and puqjoses did not
exist when the Constitution was written and whose economic, political,
social, and legal position is a crucial question of our time. Yet that institution and that question have hardly gone unaddressed in constitutional
law: the New Deal compromise was directed exactly to them. That
compromise, of course, authorizes the legislature to regulate economic
and social life and acknowledges that the distribution of wealth and of
the power wealth imports, is a question for democratic decision. The
New Deal compromise draws on many justifications. One of them is that
the Court must rely on constitutional principle and that no constitutional
principle has historically proved itself an adequate guide to questions
about the distribution of wealth and economic power. Indeed, two attempts to develop such a principle failed conspicuously. In the era of
substantive due process, the Court attempted to restrict the state's control of corporate power and of the redistribution of wealth, and that attempt had, by the time of the New Deal, been discredited. Subsequently,
the Court considered constitutionally mandating the redistribution of
wealth, and, in the face of acute difficulties in practice and principle, retreated. 146 In sum, after the New Deal compromise, the Court lacked
both the authority and the doctrine with which to supervene legislative
decisions about the corporation and its economic and political power.

This brief history of the contest between the judiciary and the legislature over the regulation of the corporation likewise indicates the importance of the category through which the Court chooses to analyze a
problem. Had Bellotti been categorized as a problem in the regulation of
the corporation, one supposes that the statute would have been readily
145. G. KOLKO, THE TRI,UMPH OF CONSERVATISM 301-02 (1963).
146. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
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sustained. Because it was categorized as a first amendment problem, the
statute was overturned. Analyzing a constitutional problem that falls between (or within) two different standard categories is always difficult.
But we can at least observe about Bellotti that the Court's first amendment theory, by drawing attention from the speaker to the speech, allowed the Court to avoid dealing with the crucial fact that the case raised
questions about the economic and political power of the corporation.
B.

THE CORPORATION AND THE STATE

Having described the historical justification for regulating corporations and their acts with special stringency, I will next argue that the
corporation has a special relationship with the state which justifies treating corporate speech differently from an individual's speech. This special
relationship was central to Justice White's dissent in Bellotti, and properly so. It inheres first in the fact that the corporate form is, in a useful if
somewhat metaphorical sense, the creature of the state. As such its powers are defined by the state. The state may presumably decline to make
the corporate form available, and it is hard to see why the corporate
form's ability to produce speech ought to constrain the state's authority
to define the corporate form's limits. The state's need to specify the uses
to which the corporate form may be devoted is amplified by the state's
having endowed the corporation with an array of powers and privileges
generally beyond those of the other associational forms the state makes
possible. Justice White listed a few of the "special rules relating to such
matters as limited liability, perpetual life, and the accumulation, distribution, and taxation of assets." 147 He argued that these special rules almost
obliged the state to consider the political consequences of corporate
power:
Massachusetts could permissibly conclude that not to impose limits
upon the political activities of corporations would have placed it in a
position of departing from neutrality and indirectly assisting the propagation of corporate views because of the advantages its laws give to
the corporate acquisition of funds to finance such activities. Such expenditures may be viewed as seriously threatening the role of the First
Amendment as a guarantor of a free marketplace of ideas. 148

In other words, when the state created the corporate form, as when the
state created nuclear power, it created something with power to do both
great good and great evil. In both cases, the state was obligated to ensure
147. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 809.
148. Id. at 809-10.
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that the power was exercised for the former and not the latter purpose.
And in the case of the corporation, there was a further danger. As Justice Rehnquist (beguilingly enough) put it, "the States might reasonably
fear that the corporation would use its economic power to obtain further
benefits beyond those already bestowed." 149
The second aspect of the corporation's special relationship with the
state might be described in "entanglement" terms. The state is so involved in so many of a corporation's activities that it is hard to think of
corporations as meaningfully independent of the state which authorizes
them, nurtures them, regulates them, and tradeS with them. 150 Particularly in the case of closely regulated corporations like banks and public
utilities, logic might even lead us to find state action in much of their
behavior, and it is probably only fear of the slippery slope which keeps us
from doing so. 151 Given such entanglement, the considerations described
in the preceding paragraph become all the more acute. 152
In looking at the historica:I experience with the corporation and at
its present relationship with the state, we have identified reasons for the
state to regulate the corporation with specia:I strictness and have seen
that those reasons have long been validated by practice. We need now to
149. Id. at 826.
150. This entanglement theory received intriguing judicial statement in the New York Court of
Appeals' opinion in the Grand Central Terminal case, Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 42
N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977), which held that, in calcu·
lating whether a landmark-preservation ordinance unconstitutionally deprived a corporation of a
reasonable return on its property, courts should consider that part of the value of the property had
been created by society. The court observed that
railroads have always been a franchised and regulated public utility, favored monopolies at
public expense, subsidy, and with limited powers of eminent domain. . . • [R]ailroads were
dependent on government granted monopolies for their rights of way, government grants
for their land, and government assistance for such projects as grade crossing eliminations.
Railroads were given franchise to nse city streets without charge. . . • Today, government
influence is even more pervasive, extending even to the real estate exemption enjoyed by
Grand Central Terminal itself....
Without the assistance of the city's transit system, now municipally owned and subsi·
dized, the property ... would be of considerably decreased value.
Id. at 332, 366 N.E.2d at 1275-76, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 919.
151. Cf Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (state action existed where a
city leased space in a parking structure to a cafe but did not include anti-discrimination condition in
the lease). But see Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (action of privately
owned and operated but publicly licensed and regulated utility corporation not state action).
152. The Court has not been persuaded by this reasoning. See generally Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (New York regulation prohibiting utility
from advertising to promote use of electricity held unconstitutional); Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n., 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (utility's insertion of monthly bill inserts discussing
controversial public policy is protected by Constitution).
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shift our focus from the general social and political situation of the corporation to the particular situation of the corporation as a first amendment actor. We need, in other words, to look at the corporation as a
speaker.
C.

CORPORATE SPEECH AND HUMAN SPEECH

Corporate speech is not human speech, and it differs from human
speech in ways that make it less valuable for first amendment purposes.
Of course, humans decide how the corporation will speak, but those
humans both are constrained in formulating their speech in ways that
may make the speech less "true" and are simultaneously freed from some
of the constraints that ordinarily prevent human speech from being false.
First, corporate speech is the speech of agents, the speech of managers running the corporation on behalf of shareholders. Those agents are
constrained by law in one major way: they must devote their efforts to
profiting their stockholders. 153 Other activities are ultra vires. 154 This
being so, all permissible corporate speech is "commercial speech," speech
in aid (ultimately, at least) of effectuating a commercial transaction. The
corporation is thus in a peculiarly difficult position to speak "truthfully,"
for it is legally obliged to maximize its profits and to represent its own
economic self-interest. True, no corporation is legally obliged to lie. But
even leaving aside the pressure to deceive created by a legal duty to make
profits, a felt obligation to represent someone else's interests often conduces to behavior one would reject in serving oneself. When we add to
these considerations the criticisms made above of the Court's commercial
speech doctrine, we begin to approach the Court's classic definition of
less-valued speech: utterances which "are no esst'!ntial part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
153. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
154. Thus charitable contributions are commonly justified in terms of their nltimate benefit to
the corporation. E.g., A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 58 (1953). Corporation
Jaw, of course, increasingly has loosened the constraints of the ultra vires doctrine. As Professor
Brudney notes, after the Second World War,
although public fear of corporate political influence did not appear to Jessen, and indeed,
legislation tightened restrictions on corporate expenditures for such purposes, developing
notions of corporate responsibility altered the direction of corporate Jaw.... This movement led to authorization and encouragement of corporate participation in public affairs,
including politics, in ways that are often only remotely connected with the corporation's
profit-making function.
Brudney, Business Corporation and Stockholders' Rights Under the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J.
235, 235-36 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
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interest in order and morality." 155 That commercial speech is inherently
less reliable and more in need of regulation than most other kinds of
speech is in fact implied by the Court's care in Virginia Pharmacy 156 to
protect only factual, readily verifiable commercial speech. This view accords with common experience, to say nothing of the FTC's
experience. 157
This argument is open to the criticism I make of the Court's arguments-that it is formalistic, since it assumes corporations and their
managers will mechanically obey the law's requirements. One may, I
suppose, legitimately refute a formalistic argument in formalistic terms.
But the more significant response to this criticism is that, in the real
world, managers' reputations often are affected, (directly and indirectly)
by their corporations' profits, and managers generally believe their first
and overriding duty is to win a profit for their shareholders. It is of
course true that, in the real world, managers are motivated by a good
many things besides profits, notably including, for example, the desire to
run a large, a prestigious, an innovative, a tightly controlled, or a peaceful organization. But these motives are akin to the profit motive in their
capacity to seduce managers from disinterest, dispassion, and accuracy.
To put the point somewhat differently, corporate speech-and here
again it is significant that corporate speech is the speech of the corporation's managers, and not its owners-should be understood in terms of
how making decisions in any large organization distances people from
the effects of their decisions and thus reduces the sense of personal obligation that helps keep people truthful. In his concurrence in Bell v.
Maryland, 158 Justice Douglas quoted Thorstein Veblen as saying that the
corporation is "immune from neighborly personalities and from sentimental considerations and scruples." 159 Douglas continued quoting:
It takes effect through the colorless and impersonal channels of corpo-

ration management, at the hands of businesslike officials whose discretion and responsibility extend no further than the procuring of a
reasonably large-that is to say the largest obtainable-net gain in
terms of price. . . . Personalities and tangible consequences are eliminated and the business of governing the rate and volume of the output
goes forward in terms of funds, prices, and percentages. 160
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
(1923)).
160.

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
425 u.s. 748 (1976).
See Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, SO HARV. L. REV. 1005 (1967).
378 u.s. 226 (1964).
!d. at 264 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting T. VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP 215
/d. at 264-65 (quoting T. VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP 215-16 (1923)).
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This concern is an old one in American history. Professor Friedman writes of the early nineteenth century: "The word 'soulless' constantly recurs in the debates on corporations. . . . Corporations, it was
feared, could concentrate the worst urges of whole groups of men; the
economic power of a corporation would not be tempered by the mentality of any one man, or by considerations of family or morality." 161 The
point, of course, is not that corporate executives are wicked. On the contrary, the point is that even good people operating in large organizations
work under circumstances that can be unconducive to seeing and telling
truth. To make the point less invidiously, we might remind ourselves
how readily quite honorable lawyers come to see justice in terms of their
clients' interests. There are, in short, pressures on the managers of large
corporations which have nothing to do with the telling of truth, and
these pressures are institutionalized and strong far beyond those on most
individuals. And these are pressures which the law may properly take
into account.
I began this section on the relevance of the corporate form by noting
that even Meiklejohn excluded commercial speech from first amendment
protection and was more concerned that everything worth saying be said
than that everyone should be able to speak. Subsequently, I have argued
that corporate speech differs from human speech in ways that make it
less worthy of first amendment protection. It might seem to be a weakness of both Meiklejohn's argument and mine that, relying on them, anyone's speech could too easily be restricted on the ground that his
speaker's information had already been made available or was sullied by
self-interest. But it is exactly the fact that the speech is the speech of a
corporation and not a human being that keeps this slippery slope from
being problematic. A person's speech can ordinarily not be limited on
those grounds because the speech effectuates his right to participate in
governing and, arguably, his right to self-expression. A corporation's
speech can be so limited because a corporation has neither of those two
rights. 162
161. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 171-72.
162. The criticism which I am rejecting here could be phrased somewhat differently, but not, I
think, more successfully. Thus it might be contended that my argument proves too much, that there
are situations in which individuals speaking for themselves are operating under disincentives to
truth-telling quite as great as those in the corporation, that voluntary associations are sometimes so
large that they have the same effect on their leadership as the corporation, and that freedom of
speech should be denied neither an individual nor a voluntary association. But the instrumentalist
argument for regulating the speech of corporations is limited by the argument from democracy (or
Meiklejohn, or Scanlon): individuals have a right to speak as inanely (or to a considerable extent, as
untruly) as they wish, because they have a first amendment right to join in governing society, and
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THE CORPORATION AS AN ASSOCIATION

I have argued that the history of the corporation, its relationship
with the state, and its own character combine to justify special regulation
of corporate speech. One might respond to these arguments that the corporation is simply an association of people, that once the state has created an association of people, they have associational rights, and that
preeminent among those rights is the right to speech. 163 Indeed, one
kind of case frequently cited to demonstrate that the first amendment
applies to corporations is the kind typified by NAACP v. Button. 164 In
that case the NAACP, a nonprofit membership corporation, had sued to
enjoin Virginia from enforcing a statute limiting the NAACP's ability to
"solicit" legal business. The Court held that the NAACP could assert
constitutional claims on its own behalf "though a corporation." 165 As
the last clause implies, NAACP v. Button hardly stands for any broad
position that corporations have first amendment rights. But we need not
rely on the language of Button to see the weakness of the "association"
argument for corporate free speech. Consider first that the NAACP was
a nonprofit corporation. The availability of such non-commercial associational forms speaks directly to the question whether shareholders of
corporations need to be accorded associational rights: If the state provides such alternative organizational forms, it need not, I suggest, give
full-scale associational rights to corporations. Further, since these alternative forms are nonprofit, underlying worries about commerical speech
and the malign influence of the cash nexus become irrelevant.
Consider second that the NAACP was a membership corporationit was in a useful, albeit limited, sense the collective voice of its individual
members, not the artificial entity which is the commercial corporation.
As the Court wrote in an earlier NAACP case, the NAACP "is the appropriate party to assert [its members'] rights, because it and its members
voluntary associations are groups of individuals acting together to exercise that right. Corporations,
however, cannot usefully be so described, as I argue in the next section.
163. One comment on Bellotti attempts to build on this association argument:
The majority's primary reliance on the importance of corporate political speech in informing the public neglected a stronger argument: corporate political expressions should be
protected as the speech and associational activity of the inclividual owners. Ultimately,
corporations are individuals organized ... by the state. . • . Corporate political expression
is simply shareholder speech or the product of shareholder associational activity.
The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REv. 57, 165-66 (1978) (footnotes omitted); see also
Comment, Constitutionality of the Federal Ban on Corporate and Unio11 Campaign Contributions and
Expenditures, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 148, 155-56 (1974) (corporate political speech may express the
interests of its members and also may be motivated by purely economic concerns).
164. 371 u.s. 415 (1963).
165. /d. at 428.
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are in every practical sense identical." 166 But only in the most attenuated
sense is the kind of corporation at which the Massachusetts statute was
directed an association of individuals. As this section tries to demonstrate, the chain of ownership is too long, and corporations are too ungovernable, for corporations legitimately to claim to represent the
thoughts of their owners. Thus, corporations are in this respect readily
distinguishable from voluntary associations like the NAACP and, to take
a slightly harder case, unions.
Unions, to take the harder case, are made up of members all of
whom made a direct (if sometimes coerced) decision to join and all of
whom have an equal role in governing the union (within the usual confines of running a large organization). In contrast, many of the people
who own corporations do not even know they own them, and not only is
it a cliche of modem scholarship that shareholders have little control
over the company, many of the "owners" of corporations are not even
able to vote, much less to have one vote per person. In short, a union
may plausibly be called a group of people who have joined together and
who share in the management of their group and whose group thus
speaks for them; the same cannot plausibly be said of owners of a large,
publicly held corporation.
The remoteness of a large corporation from its owners is not easily
exaggerated. There are, of course, individuals who directly own shares of
stock. But some stock does not even give these owners voting rights, and
the holder of convertible debt may be an owner of the corporation in a
truer sense than the holder of nonvoting stock. In any event, most stock
is not held directly by individuals. Some stock is held for individuals in a
mutual fund, but it is the rare investor in a mutual fund who can say at
any one point what stocks he owns through the fund. Most stock is held
by institutions like pension funds and thus is highly remote from the
control of its ultimate beneficiaries. And of course much stock is held by
corporations, so that tracing "ownership" is a dizzying and impossible
task.
This remoteness of the corporation from its owners is intensified by
(and itself intensifies) the ungovernability of the corporation, an ungovernability of which Berle and Means began to convince us half a century ago. 167 The usual fact of corporate life is that management runs the
166. NAACP v. Alabama ex rei. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,459 (1958); accord Bell v. Maryland,
378 U.S. 226, 267 (1963) (separate opinion of Douglas, J., Appendix 1).
167. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CoRPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1932). As the biographer of the nineteenth-century student of management Henry Poor wrote, "By
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corporation-it controls the proxies and the board of directors, and even
where it doesn't, almost all those involved would rather bear those ills
they have than fly to others they know not of. 168 Neither is there "review
by the company's salaried employees, wage earners, and customersother groups on whose behalf corporate officers are said to administer
corporate assets. As a result, the opinions of the corporation tend to be
the personal opinions of its management." 169 Nor do the devices that are
supposed to ensure corporate democracy-the shareholder proposal and
the derivative suit-give shareholders anything like the kind of influence
which would allow us to think of the corporation as reflecting the will of
its "members." 170
The inaccuracy of equating a corporation with an association in order that the first amendment rights of its owners be secured for the corporation has been expressed in terms by Justice Douglas. Bell v.
Maryland 171 is one of the sit-in cases in which the Court reversed the
judgment against the demonstrators but was at pains to avoid the difficult
constitutional issues involved. Justice Douglas was at no such pains,
however, and his concurring opinion attacked the argument that a "privacy" interest of the lunch counter's owner-a corporation-could be
weighed against the interests of the demonstrators. "In the simple agricultural economy that Jefferson extolled," Justice Douglas wrote, "the
conflicts posed were highly personal. But how is a 'personal' right infringed when a corporate chain store, for example, is forced to open its
lunch counters to people of all races?" 172 He pointed out the many kinds
of people who may control a corporation: "when corporate
the end of the 1850's Poor was tracing nearly all the problems of the railroads to the underlying fact
that their managers did not own and their owners did not manage." Chandler, Henry Varnum Poor,
in MEN IN BUSINESS 256 (W. Miller ed. 1953), quoted in T. COCHRAN, CHALLENGES TO AMERICAN
VALUES 66 (1985); see also J. HURST, THE LEGmMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION, supra
note 135, at 75-111.
168. See Solomon, Restructuring the Corporate Board ofDirectors: Fond Hope-Faint Promise?,
76 MICH. L. REv. 581 (1978).
169. Comment, Corporate Political Affairs Programs, 10 YALE L.J. 821, 833 (1961).
170. Dissatisfied shareholders in endocratic corporations sell their securities rather than
fight management. Research has failed to uncover a single shareholder proposal that has
been adopted over the opposition of the management of an endocratic corporation. Indeed,
stockholders taking advantage of section 14-A-8 have had difficulty mustering more than
10% of the votes cast at an annual meeting.
Id. at 849 (footnotes omitted).
171. 378 u.s. 226 (1963).
172. Id. at 263 (separate opinion of Douglas J., Appendix 1).
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restauranteurs are involved, whose 'personal prejudices' are being protected? The stockholders'? The directors'? The officers'? The managers'?"173 In sum, "[t]he corporation that owns this restaurant did not
refuse service to these Negroes because 'it' did not like Negroes. The
reason 'it' refused service was because 'it' thought 'it' could make more
money by running a segregated restaurant." 174
From the uncontrollability of the corporation Justice White builds
one of his justifications for the Massachusetts statute tested in Bellottithat it protects the interests of minority shareholders. But this argument,
like so many in that case, seems to me essentially formalistic, for it too
treats the corporation as though it genuinely were an association of
stockholders. Justice White is able to point to the Court's repeated recognition that "one of the purposes of the [federal] Corrupt Practices Act
was . . . to protect minority interests from domination by corporate or
union leadership." 175 But the Court also has noted that "the protection
of ordinary stockholders was at best a secondary concern" of the Act. 176
The basic problem with Justice White's approach-and, inferentially, with the Court's-may be discovered by examining the cases he
used to demonstrate that stockholders have a first amendment interest in
not being affilitated with the expression of opinions with which they may
disagree. In each of those three cases-Board of Education v. Barnette, 177 Machinists v. Street, 178 and Abood v. Detroit Board of Education 179-a person was affiliated with a viewpoint more coercively and
more personally than in Bellotti. The coercive element was strong in
each case. Barnette, which held that a student cannot be required to
salute the flag and recite the pledge of allegiance in school, occurred during wartime and involved coercion having the force of law directed at a
young person in a milieu expressly desigued for socialization. Abood and
Street forbade unions which had agency-shop agreements from spending
compulsorily collected dues to support political expression. Loss of one's
job was the penalty for refusing to affiliate oneself with another's expression. The sacrifice, and hence the coercive force, of foregoing an investment in a particular company is clearly slighter in almost every sense and
circumstance than the sacrifice of one's conscience or one's job. Further,
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 246 (separate opinion of Douglas J.).
Id. at 245.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 819 (White, J., dissenting).
Cort v. Ash, 422 u.s. 66, 81 (1974).
319 u.s. 624 (1942).
367 u.s. 740 (1960).
431 u.s. 209 (1977).
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these cases involved a more direct and personal affiliation with expression
than in Bellotti. The students in Barnett were made to rise publicly and
regularly to affirm a belief contrary to their religious faith. The employees in Street and Abood were regularly forced to pay money to an organization which crucially affected many aspects of their lives and whose
members were their daily associates. In contrast, the stockholder is
likely never to hear the political opinions expressed by his corporation,
never to see an officer or even an employee of it, never to feel a special
attachment or susceptibility to it, and never to be perceived as represented by it. 180
In the light of these contrasts, it seems exaggerated to say, as Justice
White does, that "the State has a strong interest in assuring that its citizens are not forced to choose between supporting the propagation of
views with which they disagree and passing up investment opportunities."181 True, Justice White adds that the state has an interest in ensuring that the corporation's economic functions are not inhibited by the
intrusion of investors' political proclivities into their business decisions.182 But simply as a matter of fact, it seems unlikely that many investors would be so affected. 183

Nevertheless, this criticism of Justice White is overly harsh, and it
ignores a more persuasive corollary of his argument. As he points out,
the realities of corporate life dictate that the views the corporation will
express are, at least to a significant degree, the views of management, not
the views of "the corporation." 184 Society may legitimately try to prevent a few people from mobilizing the resources of a corporation to amplify their own speech. Corporate management, in other words, is using
180. For a defense of Justice White's position and a stirring attack on the Bellotti majority's
view of corporate law, see Bradney, Business Corporations and Stockholders' Rights Under tlze First
Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235 (1981).
181. 435 U.S. at 818 (White, J., dissenting).
182. /d.
183. Professor Bradney notes that institutional investors like universities and pension funds are
increasingly inclined to take social and political factors into account in making their investments
and in making decisions about the stock they own. Bradney, supra note 180, at 236-38. This devel·
opment certainly lends credibility to the state's interest in protecting minority shareholders. On the
other hand, such shareholders (and such prospective purchasers of stock) seem much likelier to be
concerned with the actual policies pursued by corporations (e.g., investments in South Africa) than
with their contributions to referendum campaigns.
184. Justice White's opinion leans heavily on the logic of the statute:
The Massachusetts statute challenged here forbids the use of corporate funds to publish
views about referenda issues having no material effect on the business, property, or assets of
the corporation. The legislative judgment that the personal income tax issue, which is the
subject of the referendum out of which this case arose, has no such effect was sustained by
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and is not disapproved by this Court today.
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something that it does not own and that cannot wholly be ceded to it to
express views which can too easily be personal to it. 185
The argument that a corporation is a kind of association and thus
should have an association's first amendment rights is not without superficial appeal. But a realistic look at the large corporation indicates that it
is too much an artificial entity, too distant from its owners, to be usefully
assimilated with the association. This is not to say that the largest associations (unions come most quickly to mind) will not take on some of
the characteristics of the corporation, or that small corporations may not
look something like associations. But the core differences are great
enough to make the distinction not only useful, but necessary.

E. A

NOTE ON GROSJEAN V. AMERICAN PRESS

Grosjean v. American Press Co. 186 was cited in Bellotti for the proposition that corporate speech may come within the first amendment's protection. 187 Grosjean declared unconstitutional a Louisiana (read Huey
Long) tax on newspapers with a circulation of more than 20,000 copies
Hence, as this case comes to us, the issue is whether a State may prevent corporate management from using the corporate treasury to propagate views having no connection with
the corporate business.
435 U.S. at 802-03. Justice White relies enthusiastically on this reasoning. Nonetheless, whatever
the Supreme Judicial Court may have held, it is too easy to believe not only that the adoption of an
income tax would affect the economy of Massachusetts, the corporation's business, and eventually
the corporate tax structure, but also that the adoption of almost any significant economic or social
program would have similar consequences. Indeed, many corporations are now so large that very
few programs of social, economic, or political importance do not affect them. What is good for
General Motors may not be good for the country, but what affects General Motors affects the country, and vice-versa. The expansion in the last three decades of the kinds of corporate charitable
contributions that are intra vires reflects this interrelationship. As early as 1896, a leading case held
that a corporation's contribution to a local church was intra vires, since a better community would
attract better workers. Steinway v. Steinway & Sons, 17 Misc. 43, 40 N.Y.S. 718 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1896). Compare appellants' claim in Bellotti that the graduated income tax would "discourag[e]
liighly qualified executives and highly skilled professional personnel from settling, working or remaining in Massachusetts." 435 U.S. at 770 n.4.
185. See Comment, supra note 169, at 833. It is difficult to credit the Court's response to
Justice White that
[u]ltimately shareholders may decide, through the procedures of corporate democracy,
whetlier their corporation should engage in debate on public issues. Acting through their
power to elect the board of directors or to insist upon protective provisions in the corporation's charter, sliareholders normally are presumed competent to protect their own interests. . . . [M]inority shareholders generally have access to the judicial remedy of a
derivative suit to challenge corporate disbursements alleged to have been made for improper corporate purposes or merely to further the personal interests of management.
435 U.S. at 794-95 (footnote omitted). For reasons discussed supra, notes 167-70 and accompanying
text, this argument seems painfully distant from corporate reality.
186. 297 u.s. 233 (1935).
187. E.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 780. See also Comment, supra note 169, at 856-57.
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per week. The constitutional point, the Court said, "presents a question
of the utmost gravity and importance; for, if well made, it goes to the
heart of the natural right of the members of an organized society, united
for their common good, to impart and acquire information about their
common interests." 188 The issue of the corporation's (i.e., newspaper's)
rights was dealt with in one paragraph, the third (and last) sentence of
which read: "[A] corporation is a 'person' within the meaning of the
equal protection and due process of law clauses, which are the clauses
involved here." 189 The most sensible way to read this case, however, is
not to emphasize the corporate nature of the speaker, which the court
dealt with summarily, but to notice that the speaker was a newspaper.
As the Court said, "The predominant purpose of the grant of immunity
here invoked was to preserve an untrammeled press as a vital source of
public information." 190 As Justice White noted in dissent in Bellotti,
"newspapers and other forms of literature obviously do not lose their
First Amendment protection simply because they are produced or distributed by corporations." 191 In short, Grosjean may be seen as a product of the free press clause and not determinative of a corporation's free
speech rights. In view of the necessity of the corporate form for the modern press, this interpretation is sensible. 192 The press plainly exists in
large part to inform the citizenry, and the press clause can usefully be
understood as protecting it in doing so.
Chief Justice Burger's concurrence was written to stress the impossibility of distinguishing "the press" from any other speaker. Of course
there will be line-drawing problems, but two considerations make those
problems tolerable. First, the presence of borderline cases does not make
the distinction between "the press" and "corporations" meaningless.
Second, the press was quite adequately protected even before corporate
speech received explicit first amendment protection. In short, while we
may find it difficult to articulate an entirely satisfactory theoretical distinction between "the press" and "corporations," such difficulties are
hardly novel and ought not to be dispositive. In this context, as in so
many others, we may legitimately employ our historical understanding of
188. 297 U.S. at 243.
189. /d. at 244. The due process clause was involved because it was through it that the free
speech clause applied to the states.
190. /d. at 250.
191. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 808 n.8 (White, J., dissenting).
192. The Court, of course, disapproves of this reasoning: "If we were to adopt appellee's suggestion that communication by corporate members of the institutional press is entitled to greater
constitutional protection than the same communication by appellants, the result would not be responsive to the informational purpose of the First Amendment." 435 U.S. at 782 n.l8.
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differences between the two in building up, incrementally and inductively, such a distinction.
V.

THE STATE'S INTERESTS

First amendment jurisprudence, we should recall at this point, asks
whether there is a right to speak and then asks whether the right is overridden by the interests the government asserts. Thus far, we have been
looking at the first question. I have contended that the two relevant lines
of cases raise doubts about the wisdom of a corporate right to speak, and
I have argued that the history, power, and nature of the corporation
counsel against the right. The arguments I have made all, in different
ways, attempt to offset the Court's new formalism and to give discipline
and direction to its very abstract theory. I now address the second question of first amendment jurisprudence-the state interests. Once again
we will observe the limitations of the Court's reliance on a simple, abstract, and empirically uninformed theory. And we will observe that the
Court's theory is put under particular stresss here, for Bellotti presents
not the usual balance between an individual right and a government interest, but a balance in which first amendment interests are present on
both sides. To the difficulties this creates for the Court and its theory we
now turn.
At this point, we need to recall that the Court's theory of the first
amendment required it to draw inferences about the first amendment
from the basic nature of democratic government. That technique is undoubtedly appealing. 193 It is, however, a highly instrumentalist approach, and as such it requires asking which of the many conceivable
first amendment doctrines actually promote democratic government in
principle and in practice and to devise a ranking of those doctrines to use
when they conflict. The Court in Bellotti, we may recall, recruited
Meiklejohn's explanation that the first amendment serves the people's
interest in having the information which they need in order to govern.
However, even this version of the first amendment's purpose can be articulated in many forms, and each form requires a somewhat different
measurement of the extent to which any particular statute will serve the
interest in democratic government. Professor Scanlon, for instance, suggests that "[t]he central audience interest in expression ... is the interest
in having a good environment for the formation of one's beliefs and
193. See

C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATlONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

5-6 (1969).
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desires."I 94 Professor Bickel suggests that the amendment "should protect and indeed encourage speech so long as it serves to make the political process work, seeking to achieve objectives through the political
process by persuading a majority of voters; but not when it amounts to an
effort to supplant, disrupt, or coerce the process."I 95
Both Professor Scanlon's and Professor Bickel's versions of the first
amendment's purpose, it is important to note, leave room for the argument that the first amendment is best served by limiting speech. If it can
be empirically shown, for instance, that a particular kind of speech disserves the interest in having a good environment for the formation of
one's beliefs (Professor Scanlon adduces the example of subliminal communication), I96 then, in the interest of the first amendment, such speech
may be regulated. If it can be empirically shown, for instance, that a
particular kind of speech "supplant[s], disrupt[s], or coerce[s]"I 97 politics
(Professor Bickel adduces the example of speech that amounts to violence), I98 then, again in the interest of the first amendment, such speech
may be regulated.
The first amendment's purpose can also be persuasively formulated
in terms quite different from those the Court uses. For example, I would
suggest that a more powerful inference from the nature of democratic
government is not that we protect people's right to speak because they
may say something useful, but that we protect their right to speak because they have a right to govern. That is, in a democracy people have a
right to participate in governing the country however useless their ideas
are. What democratic government requires, more urgently than information, is a workable means for individual citizens-the governors-to express and effectuate their opinions. It thus requires, among other things,
an electoral process free of "distorting" influences. I99 Under this version
of the first amendment's purpose, if it can be empirically shown that a
particular kind of speech interferes with the ability of citizens to participate fully in government, then, in the interest of the first amendment,
such speech may be regulated.
194. Scanlon, supra note 52, at 527.
195. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CoNSENT 62-63 (1975) (emphasis in original).
196. See Scanlon, supra note 52, at 525-26.
197. A. BICKEL, supra note 195, at 63.
198. Id. at 62-63.
199. Meiklejohn himself can be read as reaching much this same result. Professor Bickel, for
instance, understood Meiklejohn (and Professor Bork) to have emphasized that "[t]he social interest
that the First Amendment vindicates is ..• the interest in the successful operation of the political
process, so that the country may be able better to adopt the course of action that conforms to the
wishes of the greatest number, whether or not it is wise or is founded in truth." Id. at 62.
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A central argument of Justice White's dissent in Bellotti is exactly
that the Court fails to confront the several possible first amendment interests involved. Justice White wrote:
The Court's fundamental error is its failure to realize that the state
regulatory interests in terms of which the alleged curtailment of First
Amendment rights accomplished by the statute must be evaluated are
themselves derived from the First Amendment. The question posed by
this case, as approached by the Court, is whether the State has struck
the best possible balance, i.e., that one which it would have chosen,
between competing First Amendment interests.200

Justice White's argument that Bellotti involves not one, but rather two
competing first amendment interests, is crucial to understanding the case
and to appreciating the theoretical problems it presents. This section
considers first the general problem of conflicting first amendment interests and then the particular problem of determining whether the first
amendment principles at issue in Bellotti actually serve those larger first
amendment interests.
A.

THE PROBLEM OF CONFLICTING FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS

The crucial fact about Bellotti, I have said, is that it does not present
simply a conflict between citizens' first amendment interests and the
state's nonconstitutional interests. Rather, it presents a conflict between
first amendment interests. On one hand is the citizenry's interest in being
well enough informed to govern wisely. On the other hand is the citizenry's interest in what we might call access to government, the interest
in public debate not dominated by corporate wealth. That interest has
two aspects-the interest of the citizen as participant in the debate,
whose ability to be heard depends in part on the volume of the other
participants, and the interest of the citizen as listener to the debate,
whose ability to learn from the debate depends in part on its quality. 201
This set of first amendment interests in access to government might be
rephrased as an interest in political equality, in having an equal voice in
governing. The town-meeting model is popular in first amendment
thought partly because every citizen has an equal opportunity to influence the meeting's decision. Of course, political equality, for a variety of
practical and constitutional reasons, cannot be enforced by limiting the
200. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 803-04 (White, J., dissenting).
201. A less powerful, but still discernible, first amendment interest in inhibiting corporate
speech is the interest in preserving people's sense of political efficacy. That is, people are unlikely to
feel they can affect politics if they sense that politics is dominated by large corporations, and tliat
feeling of inefficacy is likely to deter people from political activity.
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power of wealthy individuals to influence politics. 202 But it is possible,
and I believe legitimate, to limit the power of individuals to use their
ownership or management of a corporation to influence politics.
As I have suggested elsewhere, 203 the ways we ordinarily think
about rights are channeled by the paradigm of competition between an
individual (who has rights) and the government (which has interests). In
that paradigm, the meaning of the individual's right is that the government must show that its reasons for infringing the right are particularly
pressing. This weighting of the issue against the government is tolerable
partly because the government-or society at large-can bear better than
the individual whatever risks might be imposed by an incorrect resolution of the conflict between the individual and the government. In the
last several decades, however, as the number and scope of constitutional
rights have increased, we increasingly confront situations which do not
match the paradigm. Statutes requiring minors to obtain their parents'
consent to an abortion typify one kind of non-paradigmatic rights conflict: the minor has a right to an abortion, the parents have a right to
make medical decisions for their child, no hierarchy of rights exists that
would allow us to choose between the competing rights, and the presumption against the government ordinarily created by the presence of a
right cannot apply because there are conflicting rights. The statute in
Bellotti presents another kind of non-paradigmatic rights conflict, one in
which both the "individual" (here a corporation) and the state claim justification in terms of the same right. How should such conflict be
approached?
First, it becomes inappropriate to scrutinize the state interest in the
intense way we use when the state interest conflicts with a constitutional
interest. That heightened scrutiny is justified by the preferred status of
rights over state interests and by our desire that society rather than the
individual bear the risk of error. But when the state interest is the protection of the very kind of right being exercised by the individual, and
when there is no "individual" (but only a corporation) in the case, that
justification cannot apply.
This elimination of strict scrutiny, however, leaves us (in one sense)
farther than ever from resolving our conflict, since strict scrutiny is one
of the Court's most convenient techniques for vaporizing state interests.
Or, to put our position less tendentiously, we are farther than before
202. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
203. Schneider, Rights Discourse and Neonatal Euthanasia, 30 LAW QUANDRANGLE NOTES 33
(Winter 1986).
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from a resolution because we have a tie between competing versions of a
right and we have eliminated the presumption (in favor of the individual)
ordinarily used to resolve ties between individuals and the government.
One approach to this problem is to say that, since both sides claim to be
serving the same right, that side should win which serves it best. This
approach might work where the right involved has a single purpose and
meaning and where it is possible to determine how well each side's victory would serve the right. I am, for example, tempted to argue that in
Bellotti the electorate's interests in access to effective means of political
speech and in an uncorrupted electoral process are weightier than the
electorate's interest in the information to be had from corporate speech.
I am tempted in this direction because the former interests seem to me
closer to the basic interests democratic government serves. But the right
to speak has several purposes and meanings which carmot readily be
ranked, and we know little about how well the various rules of decision
would serve the various purposes and meanings. Thus we have no way of
choosing, for example, between a rule that served one of the first amendment's weak purposes well and a rule that served one of the amendment's
strong purposes poorly.
So difficult a general problem cannot be resolved here. But we can
make some progress toward solving the particular version of the problem
which Bellotti presents. Bellotti seems to me a case in which there is no
satisfactory way of identifying the side whose victory would best serve
the first amendment. That being so, the legislature's resolution of the
conflict should prevail. There is no reason to believe a judicial resolution
of the conflict between first amendment principles will be categorically
superior to a legislative resolution, and democratic principles suggest
that, ceteris paribus, a legislative resolution is preferable. That is, when
first amendment values conflict, the best judges of what will "promote
democracy" may be "the people," speaking through the legislature. No
doubt they are speaking imperfectly, but they are speaking in the only
way they can. The Court in Bellotti, of course, cannot regard the law in
this way, but that is because the Court views the legislature and the people as separate entities. That view can be useful, as when the interests of
legislators and the public systematically conflict or when a majority uses
its control of the legislature to suppress the speech of a minority. But the
Court does not contend that Bellotti presents either of these situations.
In short, I am suggesting that in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
we generally ought to act as though the theory of our democracy were
true.
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This preference for a legislative solution is enhanced when the legislature has explicitly considered the first amendment problems, as is arguably, though not certainly, true here. The legislature's claim is
particularly strong where a correct choice between competing first
amendment interests cannot be reached solely by applying legal principles, but depends on an intricate understanding of how things really are.
Bellotti is such a case, for, as I have argued, its outcome should depend
on a series of intractable empirical questions: How do corporations actually work? What factors affect popular debate on political questions?
Does corporate wealth affect referendum elections? And so on. As to
some of these questions, the legislature can legitimately claim some special knowledge; as to others, the legislature is at least better situated than
the Court to acquire special knowledge.
In this section, we have seen that several central indeterminacies
plague the Court's first amendment theory. Does a commitment to democratic government lead us to maximize information or to order debate,
to maximize information or to promote political equality? We also have
seen that the theory provides no principled means of resolving those indeterminacies. But even if we resolve those indeterminacies, we still will
confront many questions (often difficult empirical questions) about what
policies will actually serve the principles we have chosen. We must move
next to a consideration of how the Bellotti Court grappled with these
indeterminacies and uncertainties.
I will argue that the Court's treatment of the state's interests is inadequate on its own terms. The Court dismisses the proffered justifications
for the Massachusetts statute with a disappointingly slight examination
of the evidence. The Court has forsworn any genuine investigation of
what actually promotes free and open expression (not to say democratic
government) and has contented itself with its slogan, more is more. It
employs some of the standard devices of first and fourteenth amendment
state-interest analysis in order to avoid grappling with the empirical difficulties which in fact are central to its reasoning. These weaknesses in the
Court's handling of the state interests, further, must be understood in
light of our discussion of non-paradigmatic rights problems. These
weaknesses might be understandable if the paradigmatic presumption in
favor of the individual applied, for that presumption permits us to resolve all empirical doubts against the state. Since it does not, since the
empirical questions instead go to the very rationale for according corporations speech rights, these weaknesses reach significant proportions.
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POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND THE CORPORATION

A basic disagreement between the Massachusetts Legislature and
the United States Supreme Court is whether corporate participation in
referenda can corrupt politics. The legislature, presumably drawing on
its immediate experience with the question and on the history of referenda, decided that it can. Once again, a look at history illuminates the
legislature's concern. As the Court recognized in United States v.
UAW, 204 there was by the end of the nineteenth century a lively "popular
feeling that aggregated capital unduly influenced politics, an influence
not stopping short of corruption."205 Even basically conservative politicians began to see virtue in prohibitions of corporate political contributions. The Court in UAW quoted Elihu Root's advocacy of such a ban:
The Idea is to prevent ... the great railroad companies, the great insurance companies, the great telephone companies, the great aggregations of wealth from using their corporate funds, directly or indirectly,
to send members of the legislature to these halls in order to vote for
their protection and the advancement of their interests as against those
of the public. 206

A comm::i.ttee of the New York Legislature which was guided by Charles
Evans Hughes (later Republican presidential candidate, eventually Chief
Justice) concluded: "Contributions by insurance corporations for political purposes should be strictly forbidden. Neither executive officers nor
directors should be allowed to use the moneys paid for purposes of insurance in support of political candidates or platforms."207

It was against this background that the referendum appeared in the
Midwest and West:
Programs to establish direct lines of influence from the ordinary citizen
to his government ... appeal[ed] to most of those who wanted business
controlled. . . . [M]any believed that spoilsmen, corporation agents,
and mediocre lawyers had made politics their private domain. . . .
When corrupt or indifferent politicians refused to enact "the people's
reforms," the reformers planned to streamline the government in order
to facilitate action and fix responsibility, then let the people reward and
punish their political servants. 208
204.
205.
206.
1st Sess.
207.
(1906)).
208.

352 u.s. 567 (1956).
Id. at 570.
Id. at 571 (quoting Elihu Root, Hearings Before !fouse Comm on Elections, 59th Cong.,
12).
·
/d. at 572 (quoting REPORT OF THE JOINT CoMM. OF THE NEW YORK LEGISLATURE
R. WIEBE, BUSINESSMEN AND REFORM 7 (1962).
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As Professor Mowry suggests, then, a leading objective of the movement
to establish referenda "was the better regulation of railroads and the control of the great industrial combines, popularly called trusts." 209 But it
was not enough to control business, for business had corrupted politicians. One solution the federal government and the states adopted was a
statutory prohibition of corporate contributions to political candidates.210 In addition, states sought to circumvent corrupt politicians altogether through the referendum and the initiative. "Then, with the
power of the bosses broken or crippled, it would be possible to check the
incursions of the interests upon the welfare of the people and realize a
cleaner, more efficient government.m 11 Despite the opposition of business and the better sort, 212 such laws were established in twenty states by
1932. 213 In other words, referenda were widely adopted after decades of
experience and considerable agreement that American states faced two
serious problems: corrupting business and corrupted politicians. The
referendum, bypassing both groups so that the people could speak directly, would, it was hoped, overcome those problems. That the referendum's very purpose was to end the corporation's domination of politics
does not alone make that purpose constitutional, but it is some indication
of how, for three-quarters of a century, we have by our actions and laws
tried to interpret the Constitution and identify threats to it.
In Bellotti, however, the Court, while conceding that corporate
funds might be used to bribe politicians, was not convinced that a corporation could pose any constitutionally cognizable danger to a referendum. 214 Here, too, history suggests that the legislature may well have
been aware of dangers the Court did not apprehend.
Confronted by an array of technical questions, often phrased in legal
language, the voters shrank from the responsibilities the new system
attempted to put upon them. Small and highly organized groups with
plenty of funds and skillful publicity could make use of these devices,
209. G. MOWRY, THE ERA OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 82 (1958).
210. E.g., Act of Jan. 26, 1907, Pub. L. No. 36-36, 34 Stat. 864:
That it shall be unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by authority
of any laws of Congress, to make a money contribution in connection with any election to
any political office. It shall also be unlawful for any corporation whatever to make a
money contribution in connection with any election at which Presidential and Vice-Presidential electors or a Representative in Congress is to be voted for or any election by any
State legislature of a United States Senator.
211. R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 255 (1955).
212. R. WIEBE, supra note 208, at 181; Radin, Popular Legislation in California, 23 MINN. L.
REv. 559, 560 (1939).
213. Radin, supra note 212, at 561.
214. 435 U.S. at 790.
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but such were not the results the proponents of initiative and referendum sought; nor was the additional derationalization of politics that
came with propaganda campaigns demanded by referendums. 215

Aware that corporations could be important elements in those "small
and highly organized groups," and aware of the history of the referendum as an attempt to escape corporate domination of a state's political
life, ten of the twenty-three states allowing initiatives or referenda prohibit corporate contributions of any kind to ballot-measure campaigns,
and fifteen of those twenty-three apply campaign-finance statutes to such
campaigns. 216
The legislative and judicial history of the particular statute at issue
in Bellotti likewise reveals that the law was no caprice, but was a considered and repeated decision of the legislature. Mter the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court held that, under the legislature's first attempt at
such a statute, a referendum on a graduated income tax "materially affected" a corporation's property, business, or assets, 217 the legislature
amended the statute to read: "No question submitted to the voters concerning the taxation of the income, property or transactions of individuals shall be deemed materially to affect the property, business or assets of
the corporation."218 After the Supreme Judicial Court held that the statute did not apply where the referendum concerned a corporate as well as
a personal income tax, 219 the legislature again amended the law several
times, 220 and the next referendum dealt only with a personal income tax.
As the Massachusetts court conceded, "[T]he statutory amendment to
[section] 8 makes it clear that the Legislature has specifically proscribed
corporate expenditures of money relative to this proposed
amendment. " 221
215. R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 211, at 266.
216. Note, Corporate Contributions to Ballot-Measure Campaigns, 6 MICH. J.L. REFORM 781,
782-88 (1973).
217. Lustwerk v. Lytrou, Inc., 344 Mass. 647, 650, 183 N.E.2d 871, 874 (1962).
218. Act of June 20, 1972, Stat 1972, Ch. 458 (current version at MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
55, § 8 (West 1975)).
219. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Attorney Gen., 362 Mass. 570, 576, 290 N.E.2d 526, 534
(1972).
220. In particular, the legislature amended the previously quoted sentence by adding "solely"
before "concerning." Act of June 1, 1973, Stat. 1973, Ch. 348 (current version at MAss. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West 1975)).
221. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Attorney Gen., 371 Mass. 773, 780, 359 N.E.2d 1252, 1268
(1977). In Bellotti, the Supreme Court concluded that "the legislature's suppression of speech suggests an attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views
to the people. . •." 435 U.S. at 785 (footnote omitted). There is something to be said for this
conclusion. The legislature had plainly wished to secure a constitutional amendment permitting a
progressive income tax. It needed approval of such a change through a refereudum. The statute at
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The Court in Bellotti, however, passed lightly over both the national
history of the referendum and the Massachusetts Legislature's understanding of its experience with this particular referendum. In doing so,
the Court explained that there had been "no showing that the relative
voice of corporations had been overwhelming or even significant in influencing referenda in Massachusetts...." 222

In this passage, the Court seems to acknowledge the importance of
an accurate empirical understanding of the actual effect of corporate efforts to influence referenda. But what the Court does not acknowledge-perhaps does not recognize-is how difficult achievement of such an understanding must be. As Professor Yudof writes, "At the present stage
of research, the effects of mass communications are largely unknown or
indeterminate--at least insofar as one seeks to disaggregate complex
variables and to fashion general theories." 223 The specific question of the
effect of spending on referenda has proved difficult to study, and, perhaps
in consequence, "with the exception of a handful of very recent studies,
there have been virtually no systematic and reliable examinations of the
effects of campaign spending in ballot measure elections."224 And as one
might expect, there is some evidence that much mass communication
and much spending to affect the outcome of referenda can be ineffectual.
All this raises the question of how a court should respond to a legislature's empirical understandings in an area of empirical uncertainty. That
question is of considerable interest across a wide range of constitutional
law, but here I can only observe that two factors ought to have made the
Bellotti Court less demanding in its request that the legislature substantiate its judgment. First, there is evidence that large-scale spending can
affect referenda. Indeed one of the most careful studies seems to speak
directly·to the situation in Bellotti: "there emerges a strong pattern indicating that one-sided spending has been ineffective when it is in support
of the proposition but has been almost invariably successful when it is in
opposition."225 Second, if legislators are expert about anything, it should
issue in Bellotti was a direct response to failures to secure that approval. Patton & Bartlett, Corporate "Persons" and Freedom ofSpeech: The Political Impact ofLegal Mythology, 1981 WIS. L. REV.
494, 497. The statute thus was aimed with unpleasant directness at a particular political decision.
On the other hand, the statute was born of direct experience with what the legislature believed was
the corruption of that decision by corporations. /d. It is hard to see why the legislative reforms born
of direct and immediate experience should be disfavored for that reason.
222. 435 U.S. at 789.
223. M. YuooF, supra note 125, at 72. For a helpful survey of research on mass communications from the perspective of a first amendment scholar, see id. at 71-89.
224. Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experie11ce, Public Choice
Theory and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REv. 505, 509-10 (1982) (footnote omitted).
225. Id. at 511.

1986]

CORPORATE FREEDOM

1279

be about the effectiveness of campaign spending, and judicial deference to
that expertise seems well-placed. 226
Whatever weaknesses may have affected the legislature's understanding of the empirical questions in Bellotti-and it is quite possible
that the legislature made no more effort than the Court to assimilate the
best research-the technique the Court adopted for analyzing those questions was painfully limited, for the Court relied solely on inferences
drawn from the outcome of the earlier referendum on the income tax. 227
It is, however, flatly impossible to use unaided logic to infer from an
electoral outcome the effect of corporate contributions on a referendum;
that question can only be settled (and even settled is too strong a word)
with empirical studies. The Court's reasoning illustrates the impossibility of the task. Justice White pointed out in his dissent that when the
graduated income tax was unsuccessfully presented to the Massachusetts
voters in 1972, a political committee against the proposal had spent
$120,000, while the only group in favor of the proposal had spent
$7000. 228 The Court responded that "any inference that corporate contributions 'dominated' the [1972] electoral process on this issue is refuted
by the 1976 election. There the voters again rejected the proposed constitutional amendment even in the absence of any corporate spending."229 But the fact that the corporate position won when corporate
expenditures were banned does not prove that the corporate expenditures
in the earlier election had no effect. The 1976 referendum might have
been even more soundly defeated had corporate contributions been allowed, the corporate contributions in the 1972 referendum might have
fixed the public's mind against a graduated income tax, and corporate
"domination" of politics may simply be irrelevant where public opinion
is already resolved in favor of the corporate position. 230
226. As Justice White said of the legislation in Buckley v. Valeo, "Those [in Congress] supporting the bill undeniably included many seasoned professionals who have been deeply involved in
elective processes and who have viewed them at close range over many years." 424 U.S. I, 261
(1976) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
227. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789 n.28.
228. Id. at 811 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White also noted that three of the appellant
corporations had contributed $3000 to the political committee which had opposed the amendment,
and that committee had been supported primarily through large corporate contributions. Id.
229. Id. at 789-90 n.28. Note the absolute and confident terms in which the Court phrases its
proposition: "dominated," "refuted."
230. The Court also might have been given pause by the appellant's eagerness to be allowed to
make expenditures.
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Is MORE MORE? THE PROBLEM REVISITED

It is now time for us to return to the heart of the Court's first
amendment theory, its belief .that increases in the quantum of speech always deserve constitutional protection. In this section, I suggest that
there are times when that is not true and that the situation the Massachusetts statute addressed is such a time.

The Bellotti Court doubted that "corruption" is a notion that is at
all applicable to referenda-you can bribe a politician with a large contribution, but you cannot usefully be said to bribe the public by advertising.
The Court concluded that, " 'far from inviting greater restriction of
speech, the direct participation of the people in a referendum, if anything, increases the need for "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources"' " 231 But large sums of
money can distort the debate about a referendum, and perhaps can do so
even more easily than when the debate is about a candidate for major
office. Candidates, at least, tend to be fairly well known and are the main
issue in their elections. Referendum provisions, however, are often complex, anonymous, easily misunderstood, and quickly forgotten. Extensive propaganda can give a greatly inaccurate impression of the extent of
public enthusiasm for a proposal (making the bandwagon effect possible).
What is more important, a large expenditure can often secure completely
disproportionate presentation of the issues, so that there is not a fair
competition of ideas. As Judge Bazelon wrote in sustaining the Federal
Communication Commission's ban on cigarette advertising on television:
Debate is not primarily an end in itself, and a debate in which only one
party has the financial resources and interest to purchase sustained access to the mass communications media is not a fair test of either an
argument's truth or its innate popular appeal....
[W]here, as here, one party to a debate has a financial clout and a
compelling economic interest in the presentation of one side unmatched by its opponent, and where the public stake in the argument
is no less than life itself-we think the purpose of rugged debate is
served, not hindered, by an attempt to redress the balance.232

It is hard to relate the kind of election the framers of the first
amendment envisioned and the kind we, perforce, have now. The Constitution originally contemplated elections in which there might be some
opportunity for each voter to see the candidate. Where the size of an
231. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 790 n.29 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266
(1964) (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945))).
232. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1102-03 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (footnotes omitted).
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electoral district precluded that, an intermediary was chosen to select the
official-legislatures picked senators, electors picked presidents. There
was also a tradition of quite substantial political speeches. The Court
assumes we still have this homey kind of election, in which there is time,
and apparently inclination, for probing debates before live audiences.
But elections now rely on large cadres of workers, on avoiding speeches
of any substance, and most importantly, on expensive media campaigns
designed more to convert than to persuade. For this kind of campaign
corporations are well equipped:
Endocratic corporations can place enormous power behind political
programs, bringing to bear all the organized resources of money and
talent which underlie their commercial success. Their programs may
be particularly effective because of the skill and experience acquired by
these corporations in the use of new techniques of mass persuasion. 233
It is thus difficult to escape a sense of unreliability about the argnment in both Bellotti and Buckley that the more money contenders
spend, the more information voters will have. What contenders are most
likely to do with their money is buy short spots which convey no information at all. As the Court approvingly remarked in turning down the
Democratic party's suit to compel CBS to accept the party's advertising:
"[T]he licensee's policy against editorial spot ads is expressly based on a
journalistic judgment that 10- to 60-second spot announcements are illsuited to intelligible and intelligent treatment of public issues; the broadcaster has chosen to provide a balanced treatment of controversial questions in a more comprehensive form." 234

One wonders just what "information" the Court is referring to when
it says that much "valuable information which a corporation might be
able to provide would remain unpublished." 235 The statute does not prevent the corporation from holding press conferences to announce factual
233. Comment, Corporate Political Affairs Programs, 10 YALE L.J. 821, 822 (1961) (footnote
omitted). "The danger is that corporate managers, given enormous resources at their command,
could effectively flood the market place [of ideas] and thus stifle any genuine attempt at effective
debate." Id. at 860 (footnote omitted).
234. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 118 (1973). As Judge Wright commented
about the Court's decision in Buckley, "(B]y forcing candidates to put more emphasis on local organizing or leafletting or door-to-door canvassing and less on full-page ads and television spot commercials, the restrictions may well generate deeper exploration of the issues raised." Wright, Politics
and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1012 (1976) (footnote omitted). See
generally E. DIAMOND & S. BATES, THE SPOT: THE RISE OF PoLmCAL ADVERTISING ON TELEVISION (1984).
235. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 785 n.21.
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information (or opinions, for that matter), and almost all factual information about any major corporation is regularly revealed to the Securities and Exchange Commission. If such information is genuinely of
interest, one would suppose the press would publish it. If the "information" is the opinion of the corporation on the issue to be voted on, we are
driven to ask again, who speaks when the corporation speaks? And we
are driven to ask, if the corporation doesn't speak, will its opinions really
go unexpressed? After all, corporate officers are both apt to share the
corporation's view and likely to have the resources to make their opinions heard and felt. In short, it is difficult not to conclude that what the
Court has done is not to protect the governors' right to information, but
rather to protect the corporations' right to be one of the governors.
To this general discussion, two considerations specific to Bellotti
should be added, for they illustrate the narrowest application of the Massachusetts statute and the reach of the Court's opinion. The first consideration is that the statute does not prohibit corporate expenditures to
influence all referenda; rather, it prohibits corporate expenditures to influence referenda not "materially affecting any of the property, business
or assets of the corporation."236 "Materially affecting" is no doubt susceptible of many interpretations. 237 But insofar as the standard is well
applied, it preserves speech the corporation might be specially suited to
provide-information about its business and the things that affect itand filters out speech which is not within the corporation's special
knowledge or competence. The point can be put slightly differently. The
Court argues that citizens need all points of view when they make a political decision. The statute lets a corporation speak when it is likely to
provide a point of view that would not otherwise be expressed. But when
the corporation's interest is engaged only in the same sense that the general public's interest is engaged, the corporation has nothing to add to
the debate that is not likely to be said equally well by others. 238
236. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55,§ 8 (West Supp. 1977), quoted in Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 768.
237. See supra note 184. But recall that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court accepted the
legislature's provision that "[n]o question submitted to the voters solely concerning the taxation of
the income, property or transactions of individuals shall be deemed materially to affect the property,
business or assets of the corporation." MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977),
quoted in Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 768.
238. Compare the general principle that a citizen or taxpayer lacks standing to challenge a
federal statute unless he can show "some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally." Frothingham v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488-89 (1923). See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2d § 3531.10 (1984).
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The second point specific to the statute in Bellotti is that, in a useful
sense, the statute does not prevent a corporation from speaking about any
referendum subject. A corporation may speak to influence even a referendum that has zilch to do with its property, business, or assets. What a
corporation may not do is make expenditures to influence referenda (unless, of course, they materially affect the corporation). As the Supreme
Court noted, the Massachusetts court had
stated that [section] 8 would not prohibit the publication of "in-house"
newspapers or communications to stockholders containing the corporation's view on a graduated personal income tax; the participation by
corporate employees, at corporate expense, in discussions or legislative
hearings on the issue; the participation of corporate officers, directors,
stockholders, or employees in public discussion of the issue on radio or
television, at news conferences, or through statements to the press or
"similar means not involving contributions or expenditure of corporate
funds"; or speeches or comments by employees or officers, on working
hours, to the press or a chamber of commerce.239

This provision has two consequences for our discussion. First, it means
that, even if-despite the discussion in the preceding paragraphs-the
corporation should have important information to communicate, it will
be able to do so. Second, it means that the kind of corporate "expression" most likely to be eliminated is exactly the kind of corporate "expression" least likely to contribute to informed and rational debate on
public issues-namely, advertising. The primary purchase made with
large expenditures in political campaigns is, after all, the "spot" advertisement, which is too short to communicate more than the barest idea,
which is often non-verbal, and which rarely even attempts to trade in the
marketplace of ideas.
D.

RECONCILING BUCKLEY V. VALEO

Before concluding this line of argnment, I wish to put at rest any
suggestion that it was foreclosed by the Court in Buckley v. Valeo. 240 In
Buckley, the Court upheld statutory limits on contributions to candidates
in federal elections, but overturned limits on expenditures by candidates
or by their supporters. It might be argued that the statutory limits on
expenditures forbidden in Bellotti are analogous to the statutory limits on
expenditures forbidden in Buckley:
239. 435 U.S. at 773 n.7 (quoting First Nat'/ Bank of Boston, 371 Mass. at 787, 359 N.E.2d at
1272).
240. 424 u.s. 1 (1976).
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The Court noted that corporate expenditure bans might be necessary
to prevent the danger of real or apparent corruption in candidate elections. While this interest may be sufficient to justify limitations on corporate contributions to candidates, it fails to justify similar limitations
on independent corporate political expenditures. In Buckley v. Valeo,
this interest was found insufficient to support limitations on individual
and group political expenditures.241
Furthermore, the underlying reasoning of Buckley might necessitate the
result of Bellotti. As Professor Polsby analyzes Buckley,Z42 it, like Bellotti, presented a conflict between two first amendment values: on one
hand, the individual's right to speak through contributions to political
candidates, and on the other, the public's need for elections free of the
possibility of corruption through large contributions to political candidates. Professor Polsby suggests that the case thus means that "[t]he
First Amendment secures rights to be exercised by each citizen in propria
persona and not in communi. Governmental abridgments that are aimed
at enlarging the collective interest by suppressing individual expression,
even in the presence of massive documentation that the two interests are
in hopeless conflict, are unconstitutiona1." 243 But even if Professor
Polsby is correct, Bellotti may still be wrongly decided, since both sides of
the argument in Bellotti rely on a "communal" theory of first amendment
rights. The Court's view is that the corporation's right to speak is protected because the community needs the information the corporation will
provide. The dissent relies on the community's need for elections not
dominated by corporations. Or, to put the point another way, in Bellotti,
there are no rights to be exercised by citizens in propria persona, since
there is no "citizen" in Bellotti.
Furthermore, Bellotti and Buckley are distinguishable, and the reasoning of Buckley does not necessitate the result in Bellotti. First, where
the statute in Buckley tried to equalize voters by equalizing the contributions they could make to campaigns, the statute in Bellotti tried to protect all voters from attempts by "non-voters" to influence the election.
Second, the gravamen of the charge against the two laws is different. In
Buckley, the law was held unconstitutional because it prevented candidates and citizens from disseminating their views; in Bellotti, the law was
held unconstitutional because the law prevented those with rights to information from obtaining it. The fault of the Massachusetts statute is
not logically inferable from the fault of the federal statute. Third, the
241. The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, supra note 163, at 171-72 (emphasis in original).
242. Polsby, Buckley v. Valeo: The Special Nature of Political Speech, 1976 SuP. Cr. REv. I.
243. /d. at 20.
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Court in Buckley held that limitations on contributions are not serious
restrictions of speech, since "[a] contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support." 244 The corporation's
shareholders can individually express themselves without stint, but there
may constitutionally be limits on their expression through their corporation, just as there are limits on expression through contributions to one's
candidate.
E.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS

Massachusetts' second justification of the statute in Bellotti was that
it prevented minority shareholders from being unwillingly affiliated with
ideas they disliked. The Court's treatment of that purpose was characteristically insensitive to the difficult empirical questions involved. The
Court dismissed those questions by stating that the purpose of protecting
shareholders was "belied" by the under- and over-inclusiveness of the
statute.Z45 It is hard to believe that much can reliably be inferred about
the genuineness of the legislature's intent from the under- or over-inclusiveness of a statute. The theory as to under-inclusion is apparently that
if the legislature really wanted to do something, it would do it all the
way. As to over-inclusion, the theory is apparently that the legislature
wanted to do something too much, since in taking care to prevent every
instance of the evil to be prevented, it prevented some things that were
not part of the evil. But as Professor Nagel's celebrated student note
demonstrated, under- and over-inclusion have to be understood in terms
of the multiple and often conflicting purposes most statutes seek to
achieve. 246 Furthermore, the Court's use of inclusiveness in Bellotti is
particularly perplexing. Recall that the Court argued that the legislative
intent to protect minority stockholders was belied by the over- and
under-inclusiveness of the statute. But only under-inclusion suggests
lack of commitment to the legislative goal; over-inclusion suggests too
zealous a commitment to it.
In any event, the statute was at least under-inclusive in that corporations were not prevented from lobbying and could spend money to express their views on any subject until it became the subject of a
244. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21. The Court's theory is not altogether comprehensible, since it
seems to deny that a person can speak through an intermediary, and the logic of the more-information theory would seem to suggest that the more money a candidate has, the more he can spread
information, and thus the more information the eleetorate will have.
245. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 792-93.
246. See Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972).
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referendum. But this under-inclusiveness is justifiable. First, it is common learning that the state may attack part of a harm, and, as Justice
White contended, the state might well have decided that it was regulating
first that part of the harm which was most nienacing. 247 Perhaps, as
Dean Yudof suggests, "legislatures consider elections and referenda to be
more at the heart of the democratic process than legislative lobbying."248
Second, the legislature might have believed that it is harder to regulate
lobbying than expenditures for advertising and that regulating the latter
is worth the cost, but regulating the former is not. Third, the harm to
the minority shareholders from expenditures for advertising may be
greater than the harm from lobbying, if the harm to be prevented is public affiliation with ideas which one disbelieves. Fourth, and most important, the regulation of corporate expenditures for advertising, on the
Court's own view, interferes with first amendment interests. It seems
perverse to attack the statute on the grounds that it does not interfere
with the first amendment as broadly as it might. For example, the Court
objects that the legislature limits corporate speech only after the topic
had become the subject of a referendum, but this provision is exactly
what the Court ordinarily insists on in first amendment adjudication-a
statute drawn so as to interfere with first amendment interests as narrowly as possible.
Nor does the Court's criticism of the over-inclusiveness of the statute bear examination. In rejecting the argument that the statute was necessary to protect minority stockholders, the Court observed that
corporate contributions would be impermissible under the statute even if
the stockholders unanimously approved the expenditure. But a genuine,
fully-considered unanimous vote is unlikely to the point of absurdity for
those large corporations at which the statute was plainly aimed; such
corporations have far too many shareholders to bring them together for
informed discussion, much less to persuade them to agree. 249 Further,
while the statute is over-inclusive in the respect described by the Court, it
must be if it is to achieve its first purpose of preserving the integrity of
the electoral process.
247. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 820 (White, J., dissenting).
248. M. YUDOF, supra note 125, at 49.
249. The Court also contends that "shareholder democracy" offers adequate security for minority shareholders and that they may also use the derivative suit. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794-95. As my
discussion of the realities of corporate life argues, the former is not a realistic suggestion. As to the
latter, Professor Brudney acidulously asks why it is unconstitutional for the legislature to protect
minority shareholders by statutorily prohibiting expenditures that are ultra vires, but constitutional
to protect minority shareholders by providing for a derivative suit attacking the same expenditures
on the same grounds. Brudney, supra note 180, at 242-43.
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CONCLUSION
What is perhaps most remarkable about the Court's opinion in Bellotti is the virtual absence of the corporation from it. Yet the corporation
is a central fact of American law and life.250 As Justice White wrote: "It
has long been recognized ... that the special status of corporations has
placed them in a position to control vast amounts of economic power
which may, if not regulated, dominate not only the economy but also the
very heart of our democracy, the electoral process."251 The power of
government to regulate the power of the corporation was established by
the New Deal compromise, and it is in light of that fact that the statute
in Bellotti and the inadequacy of the Court's first amendment theory are
best understood.
The Court's first amendment analysis is repeatedly impaired by the
Court's unwillingness to acknowledge that large institutions controlling
large agglomerations of wealth are problematic in a democracy. The
commercial speech cases themselves conspicuously represent a failure to
recognize the centrality of economic issues in a first amendment context.252 The Court's right-to-receive analysis fails to ask whether the
right to receive corporate information is what is at stake in the cases or
problematic in actual practice. The Court's more-is-more theory of the
first amendment ignores the ways corporate contributions to referendum
campaigns might lower the usefulness, even though raising the volume,
of debate. The Court's focus on the right to hear allows it to ignore the
realities of how corporate speech is formulated and expressed. But to
ignore the reality of the corporation here is as unwise as ignoring the
reality of the employer's economic power was in Lochner. 253
I have stressed the Court's preference for theory over history and
logic over empirical inquiry. In doing so, I do not mean to suggest that
theory has no role in interpreting the first amendment. Obviously it
does. But the Court's use of theory is a kind particularly vulnerable, for
the Court's technique is to state an uncommonly abstract view of what
the first amendment intends and then to offer an uncommouly simple
view of how that intent might be served. Even if the Court's technique
250. See J. COLEMAN, THE AsYMMETRIC SOCIETY 9-15 (1982) (referring to extensive growth
of corporations in United States and structural change in society).
251.
252.
note 76,
253.

See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 809 (White, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 47-126 and accompanying text. See generally Jackson & Jeffries, supra
at 25-40 (commercial speech and economic liberty).
198 u.s. 45 (1905).
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were subtler, though, its attempt to deduce specific principles from a theory of the first amendment might not be the best, and certainly ought not
be the only, way of approaching free speech.254 Much of the justification
of the first amendment is found not in a priori theory, but in the fact that
history suggests that it is practical. The reasons we need to keep speech
free, and the kinds of attacks which are made on speech, present themselves in such varying and unexpected forms that they are hard to explain
theoretically, and a theory can rigidify our first amendment thinking so
that we fail to notice historical experiences which should infonn free
speech doctrine.255
In addition to the constitutional arguments I have adumbrated, several more practical considerations ought to ease our minds as to suppressing corporate political speech. First, the limits the government has
placed on corporate and commercial speech have generally been quite
circumscribed. The statute in Bellotti, for example, did not limit corporate speech, only corporate expenditures. It did not regulate corporate
expenditures except those intended to affect the outcome of a referendum. It did not limit corporate expenditures intended to affect referenda
except where the subject of the referendum did not materially affect the
corporation. The statute in Virginia Pharmacy, to take another example,
did not bar Consumer Reports from publishing a price list of drugs, nor
did it bar pharmacists from telling customers the price of drugs in person
or over the phone. Since these statutes were written when regulation of
corporate and commercial speech seemed constitutionally permissible,
they are appropriate (if not conclusive) evidence of the likelihood that
government might abuse its power over commercial and corporate
speech.
We ordinarily deny government the power to regulate speech because we are afraid of the government's biases.256 Those biases are less
likely to be present in the regulation of commercial and corporate speech
than in the regulation of most other kinds of speech, especially political
and religious speech. Even were such biases present, as they may have
been in Bellotti/57 corporations as a class are perhaps uniquely well254. But see BeVier, supra note 80, at 301.
255. "The rights which the First Amendment creates cannot be established by any theoretical
definition, as Burke said of the rights of man, but are 'in balance between differences of good, in
compromises sometimes between good and evil, and sometimes between evil und good.'" A.
BICKEL, supra note 195, at 57. For a developed argument for an "eclectic" approach to the first
amendment, see Shiffrin, supra note 43.
256. See F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 80-85 (1982).
257. See supra note 221.
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suited to defend their own interests. Indeed, corporations may be too
well able to defend their own interests and even to compel the government to regulate speech in ways that serve their own interests, as arguably occurred in the Virginia Pharmacy statute.
We also need to ask why Meiklejohn (or to take another possible
source, John Stuart Mill) might approve of the right to receive. They
emphasize that the hearer needs to receive heterodox opinion. It is hard
to believe that this is what the court is ensuring in Bellotti. Indeed, corporations already have such power to shape our national life that no information in which they are interested, and, more important, no attitudes
which they wish to foster, are likely to be long secret.
These considerations are not easy to write into first amendment jurisprudence. But they should reassure us that when we see no ultimate
constitutional difficulty with prohibiting corporate participation in politics, when we are willing to walk toward one first amendment good while
walking away from another, we act within the traditions of constitutional
interpretation and good sense.258

258. See Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory ofPartial Regulation of the Mass Media, 15 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1976).
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POSTSCRIPT
As this Article was being prepared for the printer, Professor Meir
Dan-Cohen published Rights, Persons, and Organizations: A Legal Theory for Bureaucratic Society. This book is so significant a contribution to
legal thinking about the corporation that it commands mention even at
this late hour. Professor Dan-Cohen observes:
America today . . . is a society of organizations. . . . [t]his central
societal feature has not been fully integrated into social and specifically
legal thinking. . . . Concepts, institutions, doctrines, and attitudes that
originated in an individualistic context, and whose applicability to organizations is at best questionable, are frequently used indiscriminately
and unreflectively to deal with organizations as well.

Id. at 5.
Professor Dan-Cohen rejects both conventional views of the corporation: the holistic view (which "fully acknowledges the reality of collective entities and denies the possibility of completely reducing that reality
to a description of individuals and their interrelations") and the atomistic
view (which holds "that collective entities are constituted by and are
therefore reducible without loss into individuals and their interrelations"). I d. at 15. Relying on organizational theory, he proposes a useful
middle view of the corporation which is too complex and subtle to be
summarized readily but which emphasizes the ways in which the corporation can usefully be said to act as an entity and in which the corporation's acts are the product not of a single hierarchy or of a few managers,
but rather of a complex, dynamic, and interacting set of factors.
Drawing on this approach, Professor Dan-Cohen analyzes Bellotti.
He first discounts the argument that corporate speech is simply the
speech of the corporation's managers and that therefore its suppression
causes no loss in the number of facts or ideas in circulation. He suggests
that speech can be a corporate product, a
global, nondistributive phenomenon, emanating from the corporation
without being traceable or reducible to individual utterances. . . . The
gathering, filtering, channeling, decoding, and combining of information by different components and actors result in statements with cognitive content (i.e., speech) which are at the same time distinctively
and irreducibly organizational.

Id. at 107. I think there is something to be said for the argument that, in
principle, corporate speech is something different from the speech of any
of the individuals who are part of the corporation. But I also find it hard
to believe that in practice the corporate viewpoint will not often coincide
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quite closely with the viewpoints of many individuals who will be wellplaced to make their ideas known.
Second, Professor Dan-Cohen dismisses the argument that corporate speech must be protected to preserve the first amendment rights of
dissenting shareholders. He does so for reasons quite close to mine.
Professor Dan-Cohen thus defends the Court against two criticisms
of Bellotti. However, he attacks the Court's rejection of the argument
that corporate speech can be regulated in the interest of preventing corporate speech from drowning out individual speech. The Court, he observes, equates regulating corporate speech with suppressing the voices of
some elements of society in order that the voices of other elements may
be heard. But, he cautions,
[N]otice that what would make this argument cogent is an assumption
that those "elements of our society" whose speech may not thus be
restricted have themselves an original autonomy right to speak....
This, however, is not the case in the Bellotti situation. Since the
Court rightly refrained from ascribing to the corporation an active
speech right, there is nothing to protect corporate speech against limitations whose purpose is to promote the listeners' First Amendment
interests, from which the corporation's rights are themselves derived.

Id. at 110 (footnote omitted). Consequently, Professor Dan-Cohen argues, strict scrutiny is an inappropriate standard to apply in Bellotti.

